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Abstract 
 
Researchers have long believed that consumers adjust their functional expectations in 
accordance with a product’s physical appearance. Recently this belief has come under fire. 
Product categories are converging rapidly. Take modern cell phones; the physical appearance 
of the iPhone is only tangentially related to the breadth of its functionality. Examples like this 
have sparked a wealth of interest in exploring how consumers generate inferences for 
products with functions that span multiple categories. One important finding is that 
consumers tend to generate functional inferences based mainly on the knowledge of a single 
category. This suggests that new hybrid products are not necessarily seen as hybrid, at least 
not when it comes to functional expectations.  
Although highlighted as a major marketing challenge, very little progress has been 
made in explaining why single category beliefs occur, and why any one particular category is 
chosen above another. I seek to mend this gap by illustrating how context frames single 
category beliefs by inferring the manufacturer’s intent. Specifically, I demonstrate that 
context alters functional expectations (study 1), attribute preference (study 2), perceptions of 
proto-typicality (study 3), and attitude stability (study 4). When combined, the four studies 
offer a comprehensive extension of the literature on product categorization, and more 
importantly, illustrate the need to account for context when estimating how consumers will 
respond to new products with functions that span multiple categories. 
Keywords: Hybrid Products; Thematic Processing; Schema Congruity; Attribute 
Preference; Single Category Beliefs; Context Effects  
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Chapter 1  
 
“Always design a thing by considering it in its next larger context—a chair 
in a room, a room in a house, a house in an environment, and environment 
in a city plan.” —Eliel Saarinen (architect) 
1 Introduction 
 
What does it mean when someone says, “I know a cellphone when I see one”? 
Although intuitively appealing, the statement presupposes that consumers navigate their 
world in a very precise and particular way. Indeed, this is not news. Researchers have 
long believed that consumers adjust their functional expectations in accordance with a 
product’s physical appearance. Yet recently this belief has come under fire. Product 
categories are converging rapidly. Take modern cellphones; the physical appearance of 
the iPhone is only tangentially related to the breadth of its functionality. Examples like 
this have sparked a wealth of interest in exploring how consumers generate inferences for 
products with functions that span multiple product categories (Gill & Dubé, 2007; 
Gregan-Paxton, Hoeffler, & Zhao, 2005; Lajos et al., 2009; Moreau, Lehmann, & 
Markman, 2001a; Moreau, Markman, & Lehmann, 2001b; Noseworthy & Goode, 2011; 
Rajagopal & Burnkrant, 2009).  
A dominant finding in this work is that consumers tend to generate functional 
inferences based mainly on the knowledge of a single category (Gregan-Paxton et al., 
2005; Moreau, et al., 2001b; Noseworthy & Goode, 2011). This suggests that new hybrid 
products are not necessarily seen as hybrid, at least not when it comes to functional 
expectations. Rajagopal and Burnkrant (2009) coined this “the single category belief 
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problem,” and identified it as a major challenge for marketers given that consumers rely 
on category beliefs to generate product inferences, expectations, and evaluations (p. 232).  
The major concern with single category beliefs is that they lead consumers to 
ignore key attributes from a hybrid product’s supplementary category (i.e., the category 
that does not frame the single category belief). Hence, single category beliefs pose a 
serious challenge for marketers because they bias consumer inferences. For example, 
Noseworthy and Goode (2011) found that when people were exposed to a new mountable 
tablet (a novel take on the iPad) with television-related functions and computer-related 
functions, people anchored only on one of the categories to generate functional 
expectations, and once formed, these beliefs proved resilient over time. It is in this 
respect that the single category belief problem is an activation problem. The first category 
that activates is the only category considered, and as long as the category submits a viable 
answer, all other categories are ignored (Murphy & Ross, 2010).  
Despite the concern, very little progress has been made in explaining why single 
category beliefs occur in the first place, and why any one particular category is chosen 
above another. The goal of this dissertation is to illustrate that people use the surrounding 
context to set the base referent for new ambiguous products, and this has significant 
implications beyond categorization. Specifically, I find that context influences functional 
expectations (study 1), attribute preference (study 2), perceptions of proto-typicality 
(study 3), and most importantly, attitude stability (study 4). When combined, the four 
studies offer a comprehensive extension of the literature on product categorization, and in 
particular, they illustrate the need to account for context when estimating how consumers 
will respond to new hybrid or boundary-spanning (cross-category) products. 
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Chapter 2  
 
2 Conceptual Background 
 
In marketing, we tend to adopt our theories from root disciplines, be they 
sociology, economics, or psychology. With theory comes a standard of rigor and conduct. 
Consider the broad area of information processing; researchers exploring categorization 
and dual processing models have put intense effort into stripping away the external 
context to explore a phenomenon in the absence of confounding factors. We refer to this 
quite fondly as experimental control. Indeed, the scientific method dominates the root 
discipline of cognitive psychology. Hence, it is not surprising that we design consumer 
experiments divorced from context. This has led many consumer researchers to trade off 
external validity for the sake of internal validity—a trend that has led some to question 
the fundamental identity of consumer behaviour (Deighton, 2007; MacInnis & Folkes, 
2010).  
The problem with such a strong emphasis on experimental control is that it neglects 
to acknowledge that consumption is widely contextual. Hence, context is not something 
marketers should dismiss, rather it should be embraced because it is fundamental to 
consumer behavior. In recent years, several consumer researches have examined the 
contextual variability of well-established theories (e.g., Kim & Meyers-Levy, 2008; 
Milberg, Sinn, & Goodstein, 2010). The authors typically couch their contribution as a 
boundary condition. It is my contention that many of these so-called boundary conditions 
are not boundary conditions at all, but fundamental parameters. That is, the context does 
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not moderate the theory, but rather the theory operates exclusively in a very specific 
context. There is a dramatic difference in how we frame the two. The former gives 
implicit permission to dismiss context as just another variable that may attenuate a 
phenomenon, whereas the latter acknowledges that context defines where and when a 
phenomenon will manifest. It is my contention that marketers can and should achieve a 
level of experimental control while still accounting for context. 
 
2.1 Of Artifacts and Natural Kinds 
There is a general belief that when categorization is ambiguous (i.e., when a 
product’s appearance, label and/or functions suggest conflicting product categories), 
consumers tend to rely on a product’s physical appearance to generate inferences and 
expectations (Gregan-Paxton et al., 2005). This observation fits the common view in 
cognitive psychology that perceptual cues dominate human categorization (Nosovsky, 
1986; Sloman, 1998). There are competing views, however, that suggest conceptual cues 
dominate (Yamauchi & Markman, 2000; Yamauchi, 2005). The discrepancy is in the 
type of category.  
With what are referred to as artifact categories (things built by humans), perceptual 
cues are weighted more heavily than conceptual cues; conversely, with what are referred 
to as natural categories (naturally occurring objects: apples, dogs, trees, etc.), conceptual 
cues are weighted more heavily (Matan & Carey, 2001). It would seem that only the 
former is relevant when discussing hybrid products. This is important because artifact 
categories are typically organized by function (Barton & Komatsu, 1989), and although 
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conceptual cues provide some expectations, physical appearance is highly correlated with 
assumed functionality (Matan & Carey, 2001). Thus, unlike natural categories, artifact 
categories may be subject to perceptual similarity for functional inferences. If true, we 
would indeed know a cellphone when we saw one. Yet there is reason to question this 
assumption.  
Generally speaking, categorization is believed to be graded for artifact kinds but 
absolute for natural kinds (Diesendruck & Gelman, 1999; Estes, 2003; 2004). Consider 
man’s best friend; the concept of a dog is absolute, which is to say a Chihuahua and a 
Great Dane share equal membership. A Chihuahua may be an atypical dog, maybe even 
an ugly dog, but it is a dog nonetheless. The concept of a cellphone, on the other hand, is 
graded (i.e., any one cellphone can be more or less representative of the cellular 
category). Today’s cellphones, or as they are aptly referred to as smartphones, can sort of 
be computers or even digital cameras. This is important because a graded structure 
supports the dominant view of perceptual similarity in artifact recognition (Matan & 
Carey, 2001). Conversely, an absolute structure supports the dominant view of 
essentialism in natural kinds (Medin & Ortony, 1989). Yet perceptual similarity (e.g., 
Nosofsky, 1986; Rosch & Mervis, 1975) has proven to be a less than satisfactory account 
of artifact recognition, because it is widely regarded as too unconstrained (Malt & 
Johnson, 1992; Murphy & Medin, 1985). Ironically, the opposing, more constrained 
views have also fallen short because they cannot account for gradients in perceived 
typicality (Smith & Medin, 1981). This has led some researchers to combine the two. 
One researcher in particular, Paul Bloom (1996), has offered a theory that holds promise. 
It is a theory of intuition, or better yet, a theory of intent.  
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Regardless of the differences, a Chihuahua is no less of a dog than a Great Dane, 
but any given cellphone may be more or less representative of the cellular category. Such 
is the difference between absolute and gradient membership. Bloom (1996; 1998) argued 
that artifacts lack an absolute essence because they are governed by intent. Indeed, this 
makes sense; consumer goods are designed to serve a very precise function or desire. 
Although consumers may believe dogs have some internal property or essence that makes 
them dogs, no consumer holds this belief about cellphones. The cellphones of today 
barely resemble those of yesterday. If your cellphone were to break, it would not cease to 
be a cellphone. Similarly, if you call your mother on a cordless phone, this would not 
make it a cellphone. Of course, if asked to describe how a cellphone is different from a 
cordless phone, we could do so with ease. Yet accessing this knowledge is inefficient. 
This is not something we do when navigating the consumption environment.  
Implicit in the above line of reasoning is a temporal distinction. Intuition would 
suggest that a cellphone is a cellphone when it allows a user to make cellular calls. 
However, research supports the opposite; physical appearance drives functional 
inferences (Gregan-Paxton et al., 2005). A cellphone is a cellphone when it looks like 
one. Its function—its ability to make cellular calls—is inferred given that the object was 
created with intent (Bloom, 1996). After all, why would something look like a cellphone 
if it did not have cellular capabilities? This is a far more efficient way of navigating our 
environment, with evolutionary benefit. Certainly, we would rather not test the functional 
merits of the maxillary canines on a sabre-toothed tiger. Evolution would favour those of 
us who hold that inference at a distance. Although plausible, the role of intent in artifact 
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recognition has been debated, given there are occasions when perceptual similarity fails 
(Malt & Johnson, 1998). 
As a youth, I was a proud owner of a novelty phone that looked like a duck and 
quacked incessantly to cue incoming calls. I was under no illusion, however. I was well 
aware that the product was not meant to be a duck, but a phone that looked like a duck. It 
was never meant to fly. Yet, how did I know? If physical appearance drives functional 
inferences, would I not have at least been curious? Of course, this could have something 
to do with a duck being a natural kind. Yet this example is not restricted to natural-
artifact combinations (cf. Gill & Dubé, 2007). It is also true for artifact-artifact 
combinations. Bloom (1988) and Malt and Johnson (1998) debated the concept of a radio 
shaped like a Coke bottle. In marketing, we refer to this as product ambiguity or 
conceptual incongruity—where form (bottle) and function (radio) are at odds 
(Noseworthy, Cotte, & Lee, 2011). Given the intent of a bottle is to hold liquid and the 
intent of a radio is to convey audio, why, if perceptual cues dominate artifact recognition, 
do consumers have little difficulty understanding that this product is a radio? Bloom 
dismissed the point; he argued that if the Coke-radio were to break, it would not resort to 
being a Coke bottle, but merely be a broken radio because it was never intended to be 
anything else. Yet this line of reasoning fails to account for how we know a 
manufacturer’s intent in the first place.  
The literature on artifact recognition has struggled to account for such anomalies 
due in part to the current emphasis on perceptual identification, and the fact that 
experimental stimuli are typically isolated from their natural context. What I argue is that 
Bloom’s notion of intent is correct, but it is not restricted to perceptual identity. I will 
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demonstrate that context transcends perceptual similarity to establish a manufacturer’s 
intent. In short, I argue that we knew the Coke bottle was a radio because it was not 
found in the fridges of our local convenience store, but rather in the consumer electronics 
section of our local department store. Hence, we discounted its perceptual identity as 
mere novelty, which of course, was the manufacturer’s intent.  
 
2.2 Context Effects on Information Processing 
Researchers in consumer behaviour have struggled with the assumption that people 
generally possess stable attitudes and beliefs. This struggle has featured prominently in 
the literature on product categorization. The difficulty resides in the fact that there are 
times when individuals act in accordance with their ideals, and then there are times when 
behaviour seems to be shaped by the particularities of the current context (Kim, Park, & 
Wyer, 2009). Current perspectives on product categorization only accounts for the 
former. Indeed, questions of whether or when attitudes are more or less context 
dependent have been the focus of historic debate (e.g., Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974). Consistent with this body of work, I assume the primary 
function of attitudes is evaluative, in that they serve to provide a quick summary of 
whether an object or event is positive or negative in order to facilitate approach or 
avoidance (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Further, I 
assume that different ways of mentally representing a product will translate into 
differences in attitude stability over time (something that will be explored in depth in 
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study 4). This is important because rarely is the context stable between exposure (i.e., 
when we view an advertisement or see a product on a shelf) and consumption.  
Nam and Sternthal (2008) argued that exploring context is important “because 
brands are invariably presented in a context that might influence how they are perceived 
(p. 668).” Unfortunately, challenges such as this have not advanced the discipline of 
consumer behaviour as much as one might expect. Nevertheless, there is an emerging 
stream of research examining how context can alter evaluative judgments in line with 
what are referred to as contrast or assimilation effects (Meyers-Levy & Sternthal, 1993; 
Nam & Sternthal, 2008). Assimilation effects occur when individuals evaluate a product 
more (less) favourably when it appears in a context that is more (less) favourable. Some 
examples include, viewing a car more favourably after viewing an attractive vacation 
destination (Raghunathan & Irwin, 2004), or viewing a restaurant more favourably after 
being exposed to designer (as opposed casual) clothing (Stapel, Kooman, & Velthuijsen, 
1998; Meyers-Levy & Sternthal, 1993).  
It is common when exploring assimilation effects also to observe what are referred 
to as a contrast effect. Contrast effects occur when individuals do the opposite of the 
assimilation effect and evaluate a product less (more) favourably when it appears in a 
context that is more (less) favourable (Meyers-Levy & Sternthal, 1993). Predictions of 
whether or when a context will support contrast or assimilation seem to hinge on an 
individual’s level of prior knowledge or expertise (Meyers-Levy & Sternthal, 1993; Nam 
& Sternthal, 2008; Stapel et al., 1998). For example, consider if you were to view an 
advertisement for a vacation destination while flipping through a magazine. Now say you 
have existing knowledge that there is extensive driving required to navigate the 
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destination—something you are not particularly fond of doing while on vacation. Just 
then, you turn the page and see an advertisement for a new car. Regardless of how 
attractive the car may be, you might evaluate it less favourably than you normally would. 
What is interesting about this effect is it occurs even with seemingly unrelated 
advertisements. It just matters that they are viewed in relative proximity to one another. I 
refer to this as the advertising context (Malaviya 2007; Noseworthy et al., 2010). 
We have known for quite some time that ads for several unrelated products versus 
ads for several competing products will differentially influence processing (Malaviya, 
2007; Malaviya et al., 1996). An unrelated ad context (e.g., an ad for a cellphone 
alongside ads for a wristwatch, shampoo, and a cold medicine) encourage what is 
referred to as item-specific elaboration, which is a type of processing that emphasizes 
feature information (Malaviya 2007; Malaviya et al. 1996). A competing ad context (e.g., 
an ad for a wristwatch alongside ads for other wristwatches) encourages relational 
elaboration, which is a type of processing that emphasizes shared themes and focuses the 
individual on the product category (Kim & Meyers-Levy, 2008; Malaviya et al., 1996; 
Noseworthy, Lee, & Cotte, 2010).  
Although contrast effects are commonly observed when products are seen in a 
context of unrelated products, they have also been observed in competing contexts. 
Specifically, assimilation effects occur during similarity-focused relational elaboration 
(identifying commonalities among products), whereas contrast effects occur during 
dissimilarity-focused relational elaboration (contrasting disparities between the products; 
Kim & Meyers-Levy, 2008; Noseworthy et al., 2011). The reason this is particularly 
relevant to a discussion on category activation, is the idea that when people use context to 
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discern what a product is like or what features it possesses, an assimilation effect will 
likely occur (Nam & Sternthal, 2008). The problem with this statement, however, is that 
it does little to prescribe when and why a consumer will use the context to figure out 
what a product is like. This is where the problem of single category beliefs comes in.  
Hybrid products are inherently ambiguous. They have features that span multiple 
product categories (Rajagopal & Burnkrant, 2009), but they tend to resemble only one 
category (Gregan-Paxton et al., 2005). It is in this respect that most hybrid products have 
conceptual cues (what the product is labelled as or how it functions) that are incongruent 
with its perceptual cues (what the product looks like; Noseworthy & Goode, 2011). This 
is important because incongruity can cause an expectancy violation that motivates 
contextual rehearsal (Hirshman, Whelley, & Palij, 1989; Noseworthy et al., 2011). Thus, 
if contextual information can activate associations that help people interpret a product 
(Nam & Sternthal, 2008), then hybrid products in particular may be highly susceptible to 
contextual cues. That is, consumers may use the surrounding context to make sense of 
hybrid products. 
 
2.3 The Schema Congruity Effect 
When it comes to making sense of products, we are really talking about judgments 
of category fit. New hybrid products have competing mental representations, sort of like 
dueling schemas. A significant amount of research in marketing supports a theory of 
schema congruity (Aggarwal & McGill, 2007; Campbell & Goodstein, 2001; Meyers-
Levy & Tybout, 1989; Peracchio & Tybout, 1996; Stayman, Alden, & Smith, 1992). The 
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theory was originally adopted from George Mandler’s (1982) seminal thesis. Mandler 
predicted that individuals will actively try to fit an incongruent object into an existing 
schema, and the success or failure to do so will influence how the object is evaluated. 
This is quite relevant to a discussion on single category beliefs because schema congruity 
theory is based on the premise of activation. That is, the first schema that activates tends 
to be the one that people try to match with an incongruent product (Mandler, 1982). 
Indeed, this is quite consistent with the single category belief problem. 
In several applications of schema congruity theory the manipulation of incongruity 
could have easily substituted as a manipulation for product ambiguity or hybridization 
(Aggarwal & McGill, 2007; Meyers-Levy & Tybout, 1989; Peracchio & Tybout, 1996; 
Stayman et al., 1992). For instance, Meyers-Levy and Tybout (1989) found that 
describing a soft drink in terms of all natural flavour was seen as incongruent. Although 
the combination may be incongruent in the normative sense of what a soft drink ought to 
be, neither feature is a novel addition to the concept of a beverage. Indeed, all natural 
flavour would be quite congruent with a variety of fruit juices. Yet, even when 
participants were faced with this inconsistency, the juice category did not activate. In this 
respect, many instances of conceptual incongruity are the result of the product having 
functions that span multiple categories. This is quite consistent with hybrid products. 
What schema congruity theory adds to the discussion is that depending on which of the 
multiple categories activate, consumers may like the product more. This raises the 
question of whether marketers could use single category beliefs to strategically augment 
product evaluations.  
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The schema congruity effect is predicated on a dynamic relationship between 
tension and arousal (Mandler, 1982; see also Di Muro & Murray, 2012). Consumers try 
to overcome the tension that results from an inconsistency between perceptions and 
expectations, and if successful, they tend to enjoy the product more. In this respect, 
incongruity can enhance consumers’ extremity of evaluation (Meyers-Levy & Tybout, 
1989). Mandler posited that different internal processes operate at different levels of 
incongruity. Mandler’s work was based primarily on classic notions of assimilation and 
accommodation (Piaget, 1981), as well as the fundamental principle of cognitive 
consistency, or fit (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955). Thus, the degree of fit (or lack 
thereof) between a product and an activated schema in memory will determine whether 
the product will be assimilated or accommodated into the schema (Meyers-Levy & 
Tybout, 1989).  
Assimilation, in the categorical sense, refers to the ability to fit a product into an 
activated schema without modifying the schema itself. According to Mandler (1982), 
assimilation is likely to occur when incongruity is mild to moderate. For instance, Sujan 
and Bettman (1985) found that consumers could rather easily assimilate moderately 
incongruent brand attributes into a generic product category. They referred to this as 
weak differentiation, because the incongruity is not necessarily innovative, and thus it is 
assimilated with minimal cognitive effort. Accommodation, on the other hand, occurs 
when individuals are faced with extreme or severe incongruity (Mandler, 1982; Meyers-
Levy & Tybout, 1989; Noseworthy et al., 2011). A good example would be seeing a 
vitamin infused beer. Extreme incongruity requires substantial cognitive resources to 
interpret incongruent information or to restructure an existing schema. If restructured, the 
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resulting schema typically becomes a sub-type, sort of like an exception or special case 
(Taylor & Crocker, 1981). In severe instances, the cognitive requirements are so 
demanding that people fail to resolve the incongruity altogether (Mandler, 1982). This 
leads to negative evaluations because the task is simply too taxing.   
Mandler (1982) argued that the relationship between incongruity and evaluation is 
nonmonotonic, or what is commonly described as an inverted-U. This phenomenon has 
been confirmed in the marketing literature. Consumers will evaluate a moderately 
incongruent brand or product more favourably than a congruent or extremely incongruent 
alternative (Meyers-Levy & Tybout, 1989; Noseworthy et al., 2011; Noseworthy & 
Trudel, 2011; Peracchio & Tybout, 1996; Stayman et al., 1992). Although true to 
Mandler’s original thesis, the inverted-U has since been coined the moderate incongruity 
effect (Campbell & Goodstein, 2001). The effect has proven quite robust when the 
motivation and the availability of cognitive resources allow an individual to assimilate an 
incongruent product or brand. Researchers have used the phenomenon to predict 
consumers’ processing of anthropomorphized products (Aggarwal & McGill, 2007), 
brand extensions (Meyers-Levy, Louie, & Curren, 1994), taste (Stayman et al., 1992), 
advertisements (Goodstein, 1993), and new product attributes (Meyers-Levy & Tybout, 
1989).  
Until recently, researchers exploring the moderate incongruity effect have rarely 
taken into account the context where the incongruent product is perceived. The one 
exception was Noseworthy, Cotte, and Lee (2011) who found that the advertising context 
(i.e., ads for several competing products) could help certain consumers—females in 
particular—accommodate, and thus appreciate, extreme incongruity. This finding 
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suggests that context can influence the accommodation process. Indeed, up to this point, 
extreme incongruity was all but ignored in the literature because researchers believed it 
would result in negative evaluations in line with Mandler’s (1982) original predictions. In 
fact, close inspection of the literature reveals there are several observations that question 
whether Mandler’s predictions hold in a real world context. In particular, the moderate 
incongruity effect has been attenuated by a variety of factors, such as dogmatism 
(Meyers-Levy & Tybout, 1989), prior knowledge (Aggarwal & McGill, 2007; Peracchio 
& Tybout, 1996), prior category affect/processing goals (Goodstein, 1993), perceived risk 
(Campbell & Goodstein, 2001), and most recently and relevant to this discussion, 
experiential appeals (Noseworthy & Trudel, 2011) and thematic positioning (Noseworthy 
et al., 2010). Taken as a whole, these factors caution that the moderate incongruity effect 
may be quite sensitive to anything that focuses consumers’ attention away from the target 
product. 
 
2.4 Taxonomic versus Thematic Processing 
So why does the moderate incongruity effect only manifest when people attend 
directly to an incongruent product? The answer to this question lies at the heart of artifact 
recognition. People make sense of new objects by comparing them to existing 
representations in memory (i.e., schemas). These representations are believed to derive 
from what is referred to as semantic memory (Tulving, 1972). Semantic memory houses 
our composite of categorical knowledge (Hodges & Patterson, 2005). We use it to 
understand what things are and what functions they perform. Currently, the literature on 
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the moderate incongruity effect has adopted the view that assimilation and 
accommodation are generalizations of semantic membership. That is, people try to figure 
out what the product is by comparing it to an existing schema (i.e., a semantic taxonomy; 
Mandler, 1982). However, there is much more to semantic memory than mere taxonomic 
processing.  
Taxonomic processing is the mental association of shared features that define a 
category, such as Coke and Pepsi being soft drinks (basic level) or soft drinks and juice 
being beverages (superordinate level; Hashimoto, McGregor, & Graham, 2007). 
Taxonomic processing allows people to organize their world into meaningful 
representations (Landau, Smith, & Jones, 1988; Markman, 1989). These representations 
are concrete (feature-based), within-category, and context independent (Barsalou 1983; 
Felcher, Malaviya & McGill, 2001). Put simply, taxonomic representations exist in the 
absence of the context where they are observed. Taxonomic processing serves a very 
important purpose. It allows for classification and inference (Medin & Ortony, 1989). It 
allows us to interact appropriately with objects and even people. It affords a measure of 
efficiency by organizing objects that need not look the same, but operate similarly or 
share the same function. This is how we understand that a hammer and wrench are tools, 
even when there is little need to fix something. What taxonomic processing does not do, 
however, is contextualize consumption. It does not convey information about the context 
where the product may be encountered. Nor does it allow the context to convey 
information about the product.  
Relative to the wealth of literature on taxonomic processing, there has been rather 
sparse research on thematic processing. Consider if you were asked the common 
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question, “What would you like to drink?” Wine is as plausible a response as water. Both 
are semantically equivalent in terms of the link between the category (beverages) and the 
desired action (drink). However, wine is consumed more for indulgence than 
sustenance—at least for some. Hence, it may or may not factor top of mind. If, however, 
a waiter in a restaurant were to ask the same question, the concept of wine may be far 
more accessible because a waiter and wine are invariably linked in the restaurant context. 
This is defined as a thematic representation (Barsalou, 1999; Markman, 1984). Of course, 
a waiter and a glass of wine share few—if any—features.  
Thematic representations constitute “causal, spatial, and temporal relationships 
among objects” (Ji, Nisbett, & Zhang, 2004, p. 57). They allow people to organize 
information in space and time. Thematic representations tend to be abstract, between-
category, and context dependent (Lin & Murphy, 2001; Markman, 1984; Noseworthy et 
al., 2010). Of course, knowing that wine is a beverage, similar to a soft drink, is of little 
use in generating expectation for the experience of dining-out. The combination of wine 
and waiter, however, can cue a context (e.g., a high-end restaurant) that informs 
expectations for etiquette, quality, and price. It is in this respect that thematic processing 
allows people to extend beyond classification to develop contextually appropriate 
inferences and behaviour (Estes, Golonka, & Jones, 2011). Hence, it seems plausible that 
thematic processing would inform functional inferences.   
Consider the vacation and car example discussed earlier. Although seemingly 
unrelated advertisements, the two are thematically related—a car is used to navigate a 
destination. Hence, the two are semantically linked, just not in the taxonomic sense. In 
essence, things are thematically related if they perform complementary roles in a specific 
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context (Golonka & Estes, 2009; Lin & Murphy, 2001; Wisniewski & Bassok, 1999). 
These compliments can be defined by conventional association (being commonly seen 
together) or by affordance (being commonly used together; Estes et al., 2011). A waiter 
and wine are related in the restaurant context through convention. However, a hammer 
and nail are related in the construction context through affordance (the hammer strikes 
the nail). When exploring thematic processing, it is important to identify how objects are 
related. In marketing, some of the more relevant compliments are spatial (e.g., electronics 
store and cellphone), temporal (e.g., summer and sunscreen), and functional (e.g., wine 
and cheese). The contextual dependency of these relations is what makes thematic 
processing unique. The context gives convention, and without it, the relationship would 
not exist (Estes et al., 2011; Noseworthy et al., 2010). Indeed, this is quite relevant in 
marketing, where the context is at least somewhat under the marketer’s control, and 
where choice is never void of context, be it the brand, the ad composition, or a physical 
store layout. 
It is probably important to take a step back at this point and note the distinction 
between thematic and goal-derived or ad-hoc categorization (Barsalou, 1983). Members 
of goal-derived categories differ from thematic membership in that they have some 
internal goal-based property which they all possess (Estes et al., 2011). Consider, for 
example, the common goal of losing weight: if we think of things to eat while on a diet 
we could think of things like salad, low-fat yogurt, and high-fiber cereal. However, each 
of these objects has a specific attribute (a health-related feature) that relates specifically 
to the goal, and without the goal there is no conventional association that unites them. 
These items do not functionally complement one another in the same way that wine and 
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cheese does (Estes et al., 2011). Wine and cheese has no inherent attribute that relates to 
a specific goal beyond the normative convention.  
Indeed, it is a fine distinction. An astute reader would probably argue that wine and 
cheese may activate under the goal, things to eat when dining out. The point, however, is 
there is in no intrinsic property beyond the convention association with the context of 
dining out. This is a common misinterpretation in consumer research, often labeled as 
unconscious goal activation. The distinction is important because functional relationships 
inform functional inferences. Goals do not. Hence, context is not the goal per se, but the 
trigger that activates the relationship.         
In sum, although rarely distinguished, taxonomic processing and thematic 
processing are important to the field of consumer behaviour. Where taxonomic 
processing is essential for language and the formation of lexical categories (Landau et al., 
1988; Markman, 1984), thematic processing is necessary for making sense of the past and 
predicting the future (Lin & Murphy, 2001; Markman, 1984). In a sense, it is the 
difference between identifying what a product is and imagining what it would be like to 
consume it. Both are imperative to a product’s success. Taxonomic processing is thought 
to be mainly dependent on perceptual features (Medin & Ortony, 1989), whereas 
thematic processing is thought to draw on the memory of encountering certain objects 
together in a particular context (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Lin & Murphy, 2001). Put 
simply, taxonomic processing focuses on properties that are characteristically identifiable 
to a particular sort, whereas thematic processing, by virtue of shared themes among 
disparate objects, focuses on relationships that are characteristically identifiable to a 
particular scene (Whitmore, Shore & Smith, 2004). Hence, when it comes to inferences 
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about functional intent, thematic processing is just as important, if not more so, than 
taxonomic processing because it accounts for the product category, the product context, 
and the interaction between the two.  
 
2.5 Why is Thematic Processing Important for Single 
Category Beliefs? 
There is a general belief that most objects, be they artifacts or natural kinds, have 
attributional and relational properties (Felcher et al., 2001; Ji et al., 2004; Ratneshwar, 
Pechmann, & Shocker, 1996). Where attributional properties are processed taxonomically 
via concrete, feature-based, within-category comparisons (e.g., Chihuahua & Great Dane 
= Dogs), relational properties are processed thematically via abstract, context-based, 
between-category comparisons (e.g., Chihuahua & Ball = Park; Noseworthy et al., 
2010). There is evidence to suggest that attributional and relational properties are 
processed independently (Fenker et al., 2005; Ratneshwar et al., 1996; Sailor & Shoben, 
1996). Where relational properties facilitate conceptual associations, attributional 
properties facilitate perceptual identification (Cohen & Basu, 1987; Felcher et al., 2001). 
Hence, the former handles incongruity by comparing it to prior knowledge of convention 
or affordance, whereas the latter handles incongruity by comparing the object against a 
mental representation or prototype (Noseworthy et al., 2010). The dominance of 
taxonomic processing in the marketing literature is interesting, considering that thematic 
violations (e.g., seeing a product in an unexpected context) would seem to occur quite 
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regularly, and may negatively influence product evaluations (e.g., seeing a luxury car in 
front of a discount department store). This relates to the discussion on contrast effects. 
To date, only one study has explored how taxonomic product adjustments influence 
thematic processing, and even then, the study did not look at thematic violations per se, 
but more so how taxonomic adjustments (i.e., changing a feature of a product) can inhibit 
thematic activation. Nevertheless, the study is informative because it illustrates that the 
moderate incongruity effect is contingent on the type of schema that activates. 
Noseworthy, Finlay, and Islam (2010) found that when a perceptually incongruent 
product (a weird looking soft drink bottle) was positioned taxonomically (juice & soft 
drinks = beverages), the standard moderate incongruity effect emerged (i.e., people liked 
the moderately incongruent bottle more so than the congruent bottle). However, when the 
same product was positioned thematically (soft drinks & popcorn = night out at the 
movies), people showed preferential evaluations for congruency. The authors concluded 
that congruency was required to activate the contextually dependent schema. This finding 
fits with evidence in developmental psychology that suggests people are more apt to 
attend to novel adjustments taxonomically—that is, we try to make sense of incongruity 
within a category (Whitmore, Shore, & Smith, 2004). It also fits the literature in 
psycholinguistics, which suggests that when asked to list associates of an object, people 
tend to offer taxonomic, definitional associates for incongruent objects, and thematic, 
eventlike associates for congruent objects (Blaye & Bonthoux, 2001; Chaffin, 1997; 
Osborne & Koppel, 2001). Hence, it seems reasonable that product incongruity can 
inhibit thematic activation by focusing peoples’ attention on the product type as opposed 
to the context of consumption. Yet how do we reconcile this evidence with the finding 
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that incongruity causes an expectancy violation that motivates contextual rehearsal 
(Hirshman et al., 1989; Noseworthy et al., 2011)? The answer may be in the type of 
incongruity. 
A product can be either perceptually incongruent in that its physical appearance 
defies a normative expectation (e.g., Dyson’s new Bladeless Fan), or it can be 
conceptually incongruent in that its functions do not align with its physical appearance 
(e.g., Vusix’s new sunglasses-Mp3 player). Again, most hybrid products conform to the 
latter. This is an important distinction. Evidence that incongruity inhibits thematic 
activation was found only for perceptual incongruity (Noseworthy et al., 2010). This is 
not surprising. When people first categorize an object, they tend to do so at what is 
referred to as the basic level (Rosch, Mervis, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). Basic 
level categories are highly sensitive to perceptual identity (Noseworthy et al., 2011; 
Rosch et al., 1976). They tend to maximize within-category similarity (most wristwatches 
look similar), but minimize between-category similarity (a wristwatch and cell phone 
tend to look different). Basic level categories are the first categories learned, they warrant 
the fastest reaction time, and importantly, they lend detailed inferences (Rosch et al. 
1976). Basic level categorization is one explanation for why when context is stripped 
away and participants are asked to classify a hybrid device, perceptual similarity 
seemingly frames single category beliefs. Yet there is no reason to believe this will occur 
when context is present.  
Chaffin (1997) cautioned that the degree of taxonomic processing that occurs when 
a person is faced with figuring out a novel object will vary with their prior knowledge of 
the category. This is quite relevant to a discussion on schema congruity theory and single 
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category beliefs. Evidence suggests that prior knowledge moderates the moderate 
incongruity effect (Peracchio & Tybout, 1996). Similarly, prior knowledge about core 
features can override perceptual similarity to inform single category beliefs (Noseworthy 
& Goode, 2011). This is why individuals show preferential evaluations for congruency 
when it comes to evaluating anthropomorphized products—we have strong prior 
knowledge about the human schema (Aggarwal & McGill, 2007). Hence, people tend to 
favour congruity in instances where they have well-established beliefs and expectations.  
Given that thematic processing is necessary for making sense of the past and 
predicting the future (Lin & Murphy, 2001; Markman, 1984), it seems reasonable that 
contextually cued schemas will favour congruency. After all, contextual relationships are 
based on prior knowledge. This line of reasoning makes even more sense when it comes 
to conceptual incongruity (as opposed to perceptual incongruity), because the issue has 
less to do with taxonomic violations, as much as taxonomic ambiguity (Gregan-Paxton et 
al., 2005). That is, the product could very well be identified as belonging to one of two or 
more different categories (Rajagopal & Burnkrant, 2009).  
If the schema congruity effect is predicated on the activation of a single product 
schema, and if single category beliefs are the result of singular activation, it seems 
plausible that prior knowledge or even a normative expectation of a product category 
within a particular consumption setting will inform single category beliefs. In other 
words, the fit between a product and its surrounding context should predict the single 
category that will be chosen. This prediction is not without support. Researchers have 
shown that a person’s evaluations of an object will depend on his or her subjective 
representation of that object (Lord & Lepper, 1999). However, the variability in 
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subjective representations across contexts can give rise to evaluative inconsistencies 
(Ledgerwood, Trope, & Chaiken, 2010). Thus, consumers’ evaluations of any given 
product should be influenced by the context where the product is perceived. This is 
indicative of Ferguson and Bargh’s (2007) suggestion that attitudes might best be 
described as evaluations of “object-based contexts” (p. 232). Given the current emphasis 
on taxonomic processing, it is not surprising that the literature on single category beliefs 
has been silent when it comes to contextual influence.  
Indeed, human beings have a unique capacity to regulate their behaviour not only 
for the here and now but also for the future. Yet taxonomic processing does not account 
for this. There is a dramatic difference between asking someone to evaluate a new 
product, and asking someone to evaluate what it would be like to use it. There is no 
reason to believe evaluations would be consistent between the two. Nevertheless, the 
former dominates marketing research, despite the latter more closely approximating 
reality. As stated previously, the goal of this dissertation is to illustrate that the fit 
between the context and product, be it the brand or product category, will predict which 
of the multiple categories that make up a hybrid product will come to frame single 
category beliefs. Importantly, at the heart of this dissertation is the strategic consideration 
that marketers may be able to utilize the context to activate the category that benefits 
from the most favourable evaluation and highest price expectation.       
 
 
25 
 
2.6 The Current Research 
The single category belief problem is the claim that consumers seemingly employ 
only a single category to make functional inferences for products that span multiple 
categories (Rajagopal & Burnkrant, 2009). It is an activation problem that has neither 
sufficient predictors nor adequate explanation. The effect has proven robust even after 
extensive category learning (Murphy & Ross, 1994; Noseworthy & Goode, 2011). It has 
been extended to natural categories like people (Malt, Murphy & Ross, 1995) and 
conceptual artifacts like food (Murphy & Ross, 1999). Hence, single category beliefs are 
not restricted to technological innovation despite the prevalence of tech-based products 
blurring category boundaries.  
This is not to suggest the field is short of attempts to predict single category beliefs. 
Researchers have shown that a product’s perceptual similarity can predict single category 
activation (Gregan-Paxton et al., 2005). Others have shown that dominant features, acting 
as rules, can take precedence over perceptual similarity (Noseworthy & Goode, 2011). 
Then there is the argument for the product label (Moreau et al., 2001b). There is really no 
clear consensus. It is believed that single category beliefs just happen as a result of an 
adaptive heuristic, which for what it lacks in accuracy it makes up for in efficiency 
(Murphy & Ross, 1994; 1999). Murphy and Ross (2010) argued that people generally 
make single category inferences based on the first category that comes to mind, and as 
long as that category submits a viable answer, no other category is explored. 
Unfortunately, this does little to predict which category will come to mind.  
It is not surprising that with the lack of understanding when and why single 
category beliefs manifest, researchers have turned their focus to exposing when 
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consumers will use multiple category inferences. Examples include when a marketer 
explicitly highlights the relationship between a hybrid product’s features and its multiple 
categories (Moreau et al., 2001b), when consumers are unfamiliar with the multiple 
categories that make up the hybrid product (Gregan-Paxton et al., 2005), when using 
psycholinguistic property priming (Rajagopal & Burnkrant, 2009), and most recently, 
when putting consumers into a rather severe negative state (Noseworthy & Goode, 2011). 
However, these examples constitute exceptions, not the norm. The default seems to be 
that despite consumers becoming increasingly aware of new products that consolidate 
two or more categories, they tend not to look at them that way when using a heuristic to 
establish the product’s membership.  
To date, the vast body of research on this topic has exclusively examined category 
ambiguity in isolation from the natural context, be it the physical location, or even the 
promotional strategy. This is where thematic processing comes into the mix. Thematic 
processing cues contextual relationships that activate a specific schema from memory. 
Hence, a thematic view of single category beliefs would argue that context predicts the 
first category that comes to mind, and once activated, consumers will try to assimilate a 
novel hybrid device into the contextual schema. If successful, consumers’ functional 
inferences (i.e., expectations for how the product works) will align with the context, and 
evaluations should be enhanced. This is the logic behind schema congruity theory, 
particularly with respect to the moderating role of prior knowledge. Study 1 was designed 
to explore these predictions.  
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Chapter 3  
 
3 Study 1: Context Influences Category Activation 
 
Study 1 was designed to set the foundation for a thorough examination of schema 
activation in artifact recognition. The core objective of study 1 was to test whether a 
brand and/or the ad context can influence which schema will activate for a hybrid product 
with features that fit one category but a physical appearance that fits a different category. 
Hence, study 1 was designed to put perceptual similarity to the test in a consumption 
setting that incorporates the natural context. In line with the idea of single category 
beliefs, the second objective was to demonstrate that schema activation corresponds with 
functional expectations. Finally, the third objective was to illustrate that both schema 
activation and the subsequent change in functional emphasis (i.e., whether the product 
functions better as product A or product B) will translate into meaningful and predictable 
differences in both product evaluations and willingness to pay. 
At the heart of this study is the theoretical premise that people like things that fit. 
Hence, it was predicted that individuals would favour, and thus be willing to pay more 
for, a product with a brand and ad context that convey a unified schema, even if that 
schema is antithetical to perceptual similarity. Consider the Apple iWatch concept (mp3-
wristwatch hybrid). Given the Apple brand signals Mp3 more so than wristwatches, 
people should like the product more if is found in a context that supports the Mp3 
category (e.g., an Mp3 display) than in a context that supports the alternate category (e.g., 
a wristwatch display). Although the perceptual similarity of the iWatch favours the 
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wristwatch category, it does not favour our expectations for Apple. Hence, it is my 
contention that the context where we see a new hybrid device matters. Exhibit 1 presents 
the core hypotheses that underlie the proposition that context influences category 
activation (P1). 
 
Exhibit 1: Proposition #1 – Context Influences Category Activation 
 
 
SUMMARY OF STUDY 1 CORE HYPOTHESES 
 
1.1 Schema Activation. When the brand and/or ad imagery (i.e., pictures in the ad) 
reinforce a hybrid product’s perceptual schema, participants will be more 
likely to categorize the product by perceptual similarity. However, when the 
brand/or ad imagery reinforce the conceptual schema, participants will be 
more likely to categorize the product based on conceptual similarity. 
 
1.2 Functional Expectations. When the brand and/or ad imagery reinforce a hybrid 
product’s perceptual schema, participants will make functional inferences in 
line with perceptual similarity. However, when the brand/or ad imagery 
reinforce the conceptual schema, participants will make functional inferences 
in line with conceptual similarity. 
 
1.3  Perceived Typicality. When the brand and ad imagery are aligned (i.e., fit a 
normative expectation), participants will see the hybrid product as more 
typical than if unaligned. This will be true whether the brand and ad imagery 
align in favour of the perceptual or conceptual schema.  
 
1.4 Target Evaluations. Participants will favour the hybrid product more when the 
brand and ad imagery are aligned than if unaligned. This will be true whether 
the brand and ad imagery align in favour of the perceptual or conceptual 
schema.  
 
1.5 Willingness to Pay. Participants will be willing to pay more for the hybrid 
product when the brand and ad imagery are aligned than if unaligned. This 
will be true whether the brand and ad imagery align in favour of the 
perceptual or conceptual schema.  
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3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants & Design 
Undergraduate students (N = 124; 52% female; Mage = 21.2) participated in this 
study in exchange for course credit. The ad manipulation and dependent measures were 
administered electronically in a behavioural lab. Participants were tested in groups of 10–
15 individuals, and were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions in a 2 
(thematic context: perceptual imagery vs. conceptual imagery) × 2 (brand fit: match vs. 
mismatch) between-subjects factorial design. 
 
3.1.2  Operationalization of Brand Consistency 
The operationalization of brand consistency began with the selection of a hybrid 
product. Given the purpose of this study was to explore conceptually incongruent 
products—where the product’s physical appearance and functionality suggest two 
different categories—it was imperative to select a hybrid product that did not have 
overlapping functions (i.e., the product had features from two distinct categories). There 
was also a need to be sensitive to the sample population. Thus, the hybrid device chosen 
for this study was a PEN + USB flash drive combination.  
To make sure that perceptual similarity was as concrete as possible, the object 
shown to participants was merely a generic pen. Hence, the USB category was purely 
conceptual. A pre-test (n = 30) had people list the top five brands that come to mind when 
they think of a PEN and the top five brands for a USB flash drive. Participants then 
passed their list to another participant and proceeded to rank order their peer’s list for 
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how well all 10 brands matched both the pen and USB category. The top PEN and top 
USB brand, in terms of frequency and rank, and without cross-categorization (hence, 
excluding known hybrid brands like Kingston and SanDisk), were subsequently chosen 
[BIC = PEN; MICROSOFT = USB]. 
 
3.1.3  Operationalization of Thematic Context 
The operationalization of thematic imagery was established through a two-stage 
pre-test. The first pre-test (n = 60) consisted of two conditions. The conditions were 
designed such that a generic fountain PEN or a generic USB flash drive was shown with 
a blank white background. All identifying information was removed and a single 
corresponding title, “Fountain Pen” or “USB Flash Drive” appeared at the top of the 
screen. At the bottom of the screen appeared a single sentence, “A Much Needed School 
Supply” or “A Much Needed Computer Accessory.” Participants were asked to review the 
product at their own pace and then complete an exemplar-listing task (Felcher et al., 
2001; Noseworthy et al., 2010). For the exemplar-listing task, participants were asked 
simply to list three products that relate to the product they just reviewed. It was predicted 
that individuals would generate between-category, thematic exemplars in line with the 
stipulated context (e.g., school supplies).  
Following the exemplar-listing task, the top three USB/computer accessory 
exemplars (in descending order: keyboard, computer mouse, and webcam) and the top 
three fountain pen/school supply exemplars (notebook/agenda/paper, reading glasses, 
and stapler) were carried forward into the second stage. The second stage (n = 40) 
consisted of two between-subjects conditions. In one condition, participants randomly 
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saw images of either the three USB related exemplars followed by the three PEN related 
exemplars, or vice versa, and were asked to rate the USB-related exemplar’s similarity to 
a USB flash drive and the PEN-related exemplar’s similarity to a PEN (anchored: 1 = 
extremely different; 9 = extremely similar). In the other condition, participants saw the 
exact same stimuli with the addition that they were asked to think about the products in 
terms of computer accessories (for the USB exemplars) and school supplies (for the PEN 
exemplars). The idea being that the aggregate context would cue individuals to see 
thematic exemplars as more similar (Noseworthy et al., 2010). The results support this 
prediction.  
A repeated measure ANOVA with category type (PEN vs. USB) as the within-
subjects factor and category context (cued vs. not cued) as the between-subjects factor, 
revealed that participants rated the exemplars as more similar to the target product when 
they were contextualized (M = 6.62) than when they were not contextualized (M = 4.31), 
F(1, 38) = 19.73, p < .001. The within-subjects effect was not significant (F < 1). Hence, 
the school supply and computer accessory contexts were relatively equivalent in 
augmenting similarity judgments. Given that the pre-test established the basic principle of 
thematic processing, the top two products from the PEN and USB exemplar-listing tasks 
were subsequently chosen to make the thematic imagery for the actual study (appendix 
A). 
 
3.1.4  Procedures & Dependent Measures 
Participants were randomly assigned an electronic instrument that consisted of an 
online newsfeed with a pop-up web advertisement (one of the four between-subjects 
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conditions in appendix A). Participants were told that the purpose of the exercise was to 
evaluate a new product, and they were to review the product at their own pace and then 
complete a brief questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of 13 items. Five of the items 
(anchored: 1 = not at all; 7 = extremely) captured participants’ overall attitude towards 
the product (left a favourable impression; is likeable; is appealing; is desirable; interested 
in trial; Malaviya, 2007). Three of the items (anchored: 1 = not at all; 7 = extremely) 
captured participants’ perceived typicality (is unique [reverse coded]; is likely; matches 
expectations; Campbell & Goodstein, 2001). Two of the items (anchored: 1 = extremely 
poor; 9 = extremely good) separately captured participants’ estimated PEN functionality 
and USB functionality (Gregan-Paxton et al., 2005). Finally, willingness to pay (WTP) 
was collected by simply asking individuals to list how much they would be willing to pay 
for the new product (open-ended).  
Following the randomized 13-items, the software switched to a schema activation 
task. Participants were given the layout of a hypothetical department store—sort of like a 
blueprint—with several departments, including computers and computer accessories, 
school supplies, televisions and DVD players, clothing, kitchen supplies, and automotive 
equipment (Moreau et al., 2001b; Noseworthy & Goode, 2011). Participants were asked, 
“If you were shopping for this device in the store shown below, where is the FIRST place 
in the store you would go to find it?” Participants were instructed to click the location 
with their mouse. The department selected represented participants’ categorization of the 
device, or in this case, their schema activation (coded: 0 = computer accessories;1 = 
school supplies; no other locations were selected). The entire procedure averaged 
approximately 15 minutes. 
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3.2 Results1 
3.2.1 Schema Activation 
A binary logistic regression (0 = computer accessories; 1 = school supplies) 
revealed that participants who saw the MICROSOFT logo rather than the BIC logo were 
about eight times (1/Odds Ratio) more likely to associate the hybrid pen with computer 
accessories than with school supplies, B = -2.04, SE = .42, p < .001, OR = .13. 
Furthermore, participants who were exposed to thematic imagery that emphasized the 
conceptual schema (a keyboard and mouse) rather than the perceptual schema (a date 
book and reading glasses) were about twice as likely to associate the hybrid pen with 
computer accessories than with school supplies, B = -.83, SE = .42, p < .05, OR = .43. 
The thematic context × brand consistency interaction was not significant (p = .32). The 
results support hypothesis 1.1; the brand and the ad context shifted participants’ schemas 
in favour of the conceptual category. Perceptual similarity only dominated when the ad 
imagery and brand reinforced the product’s physical appearance. Table 1 presents the 
proportion of school supply activation across the four conditions, along with the core 
dependent measures for study 1. 
    
 
                                                 
1
 Unless otherwise noted, all planned contrasts and simple effects throughout this thesis were accomplished 
by estimating the error term. Hence, the dfs are held constant, but should not be taken as indication of cell 
loadings within the contrasts.  
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   Table 1: Treatment Means and Cell Counts for the Core Measures in Study 1 
 
3.2.2 Functional Expectations 
A functional index was calculated by subtracting participants’ estimates of USB 
functionality from their estimates of PEN functionality, divided by the sum of the two. A 
positive number indicates superior PEN functionality, a negative number indicates 
superior USB functionality, and zero indicates the device was perceived as equivalent in 
both. It was predicted that participants’ schema activation would correlate with their 
functional expectations. In line with this prediction, the correlation between schema 
activation (0 = computer accessories; 1 = school supplies) and the functional index was 
positive and significant (r = .39, p < .001). There was a main effect of brand consistency; 
participants believed the BIC hybrid pen had superior PEN functionality (M = .06), and 
the MICROSOFT hybrid pen had superior USB functionality (M = -.08), F(1, 120) = 
 
 
BIC 
 
MICROSOFT 
  
Perceptual 
Context 
 
Conceptual 
Context 
 
Perceptual 
Context 
 
Conceptual 
Context 
   Schema Activation *  74% 65%           34%       13% 
   Functional Index 0.09 
(00.20) 
0.01  
(00.21) 
-.05  
(00.17) 
-.10  
(00.22) 
   Perceived Typicality  4.62  
(00.87) 
3.78  
(00.86) 
3.26  
(00.85) 
3.67  
(00.83) 
   Product Evaluations 4.61  
(10.81) 
4.20  
(00.82) 
3.77  
(00.85) 
4.32  
(00.82) 
   Willingness to Pay  $25.49 
(16.23) 
$22.91 
(16.36) 
$29.42 
(13.29) 
$38.77 
(18.72) 
    Cell Size 31 31 31 31 
Note.—Standard deviations are reported in parentheses; * = percent of perceptual (school 
supply) activation as opposed to conceptual (computer accessory) activation.  
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13.57, p < .001, ω2 = .07. There was also a main effect of thematic context; participants 
believed the hybrid pen had superior PEN functionality when the ad imagery emphasized 
the perceptual schema (M = .03), and superior USB functionality when the ad imagery 
emphasized the conceptual schema (M = -.04), F(1, 120) = 3.72, p < .05, ω2 = .02. The 
brand consistency × thematic context interaction was not significant (F < 1). Hence, in 
support of hypothesis 1.2, perceptual similarity drove functional inferences only when the 
brand and the advertising context favoured perceptual similarity. When the two favoured 
the conceptual schema, participants adjusted their functional expectations accordingly.  
 
3.2.3 Perceived Typicality 
The three typicality items were averaged to form an internally consistent measure 
(α = .72). There was a significant main effect of brand consistency; the ad promoting the 
BIC hybrid pen was seen as more typical (M = 4.20) than the ad promoting the 
MICROSOFT hybrid pen (M = 3.46), F(1, 120) = 23.08, p < .001, ω2 = .14. The main 
effect was qualified by a significant thematic context × brand consistency interaction, 
F(1, 120) = 16.27, p < .001, ω2 = .09. Simple effects revealed that participants perceived 
the BIC hybrid pen to be more typical when the ad imagery emphasized the perceptual 
category (M = 4.61) as opposed to the conceptual category (M = 3.79), F(1, 120) = 14.59, 
p < .001, ω2 = .08. Conversely, participants perceived the MICROSOFT hybrid pen to be 
more typical when the ad imagery emphasized the conceptual category (M = 3.67) as 
opposed to the perceptual category (M = 3.26), F(1, 120) = 3.55, p = .06, ω2 = .01. A 
planned contrast confirmed that despite the asymmetrical pattern in perceived typicality, 
the BIC hybrid pen with perceptual imagery was seen as more typical (M = 4.61) than the 
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MICROSOFT hybrid pen with conceptual imagery (M = 3.67), t(1, 120) = 4.36, p < .001. 
Nevertheless, in support of hypothesis 1.3, participants saw the hybrid pen as more 
typical when the brand and ad imagery conveyed a consistent schema. In line with the 
idea of single category beliefs, the finding that participants saw the pen as more typical 
when the brand and ad imagery favoured the conceptual category supports that 
participants were not accessing the PEN schema to make this judgment, but relying solely 
on the USB schema (which the schema activation task would also support).  
 
3.2.4 Target Evaluations 
The five evaluation items were averaged to form an internally consistent measure 
(α = .83). There was a significant main effect of brand consistency; the ad promoting the 
BIC hybrid pen was evaluated more favourably (M = 4.41) than the ad promoting the 
MICROSOFT hybrid pen (M = 4.04), F(1, 120) = 5.92, p < .05, ω2 = .04. The main effect 
was qualified by a significant thematic context × brand consistency interaction, F(1, 120) 
= 10.63, p < .005, ω2 = .07. Simple effects revealed that participants evaluated the BIC 
hybrid pen more favourably when the ad imagery emphasized the perceptual category (M 
= 4.61) as opposed to the conceptual category (M = 4.20), F(1, 120) = 3.87, p = .052, ω2 
= .01. Conversely, participants evaluated the MICROSOFT hybrid pen more favourably 
when the ad imagery emphasized the conceptual category (M = 4.32) as opposed to the 
perceptual category (M = 3.77), F(1, 120) = 6.99, p < .01, ω2 = .04. Hence, in support of 
hypothesis 1.4, participants liked the hybrid device more when the ad imagery and the 
brand were aligned than when they were at odds. They did not like, at least not to the 
same extent, when the brand and the ad imagery were ambiguous. This finding fits the 
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idea that people seek cognitive equilibrium—we like things that fit, be it perceptually or 
conceptually. 
  
3.2.5 Willingness to Pay 
There was a significant main effect of brand consistency on participants’ 
willingness to pay; participants were willing to pay more for the hybrid pen when it was 
promoted with the MICROSOFT logo (M = 34.10) than the BIC logo (M = 24.20), F(1, 
120) = 11.76, p < .001, ω2 = .07. The main effect was qualified by a significant thematic 
context × brand consistency interaction, F(1, 120) = 4.28, p < .05, ω2 = .02. Simple 
effects revealed that participants were willing to pay more for the MICROSOFT hybrid 
pen when the ad imagery emphasized the conceptual category (M = 38.77) as opposed to 
the perceptual category (M = 29.42), F(1, 120) = 5.25, p < .05, ω2 = .03. There was no 
difference in participants’ willingness to pay for the BIC hybrid pen regardless the type 
of ad imagery (F < 1). Hence, in partial support of hypothesis 1.5, it seemed that 
depending on consistent activation, individuals’ willingness to pay varied, yet this did not 
occur for the BIC pen. The reason this hypothesis was not fully supported could have 
something to do with category-specific price expectations. That is, pens do not have the 
same variance in price that USB keys do. 
    
3.3 Discussion 
The results of study 1 support the proposition (P1) that both the brand as well as the 
promotional context can independently inform single category beliefs, yet their fit 
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dramatically influenced category activation. Prior work has established that perceptual 
similarity drives functional inferences. However, prior studies have predominantly 
focused on products with either the brand removed or a fictitious logo, and rarely, if ever, 
has this work considered that the promotional context may transcend physical appearance 
to inform category judgments, inferences, and evaluations. This study extends prior work 
by demonstrating that single category beliefs are not only contextually dependent, but 
they can be strategically altered.  
The observation that people favour products more when the promotional context 
aligns with the brand suggests that participants were actively exploring the context to 
make sense of the hybrid device. This was also evident in participants’ perceptions of 
typicality. Indeed, individuals liked the product more when they were able to make sense 
of it. The willingness to pay results were also informative because price expectations 
aligned with schema activation. Consider if you were Microsoft, would you rather 
activate the category that fits your core competency and carries a greater price anchor, or 
the one that your product resembles? The results of this study suggest companies can 
benefit from activating a schema that best fits the brand. Finally, the observed changes in 
functional expectations relates to a second proposition (P2) that context influences 
attribute preference. If individuals adjust their functional expectations in line with an 
activated schema, it seems reasonable that attribute preference would adjust accordingly. 
Up to this point, I have demonstrated how the imagery used in advertisements can 
influence category activation and overall product preference, and how this can transcend 
the product’s perceptual identity. Of course, it is common for marketers to use associative 
imagery in their ads to contextualize a product. Yet, this is not the only type of context 
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consumers see, and it may not be the most dominant. One of the most salient contexts is 
the in-store display. Consumers have preconceived expectations for the features of well-
known product concepts, and because new hybrid products tend to consolidate two or 
more pre-existing categories, these general expectations should persist. The question is: 
Does it matter where hybrid products are placed in a store?  
There is a wealth of evidence to suggest that attribute preference is relative (for a 
review, see Markman & Lowenstein, 2010). Researchers have yet to explore whether 
attribute preference is also schema dependent. Consider, yet again, the Apple iWatch. 
Does it make a difference whether Apple places the iWatch among wristwatches or 
among mp3 players? Will this change how consumers see the iWatch? More importantly, 
will this change what consumers like about the iWatch? Now consider if the iWatch had 
superior wristwatch features. Does that make a difference? Intuition would suggest that 
preference for superior features would align with category activation. That is, we should 
like the iWatch more when we see its superior wristwatch features among other 
wristwatches. This same intuition is why marketers tend to promote in accordance with 
their product’s strengths. However, there is reason to question our intuition when it 
comes to new hybrid products.  
As mentioned previously, most hybrid products have conceptual cues (what the 
product is labeled as or how it functions) that are incongruent with the product’s 
perceptual cues (what the product looks like; Gregan-Paxton et al., Noseworthy & 
Goode, 2011). This is believed to result in category uncertainty (Gregan-Paxton et al., 
2005; Moreau et al., 2001b). Researchers have recently discovered that consumers will 
actively contrast incongruent products against the surrounding context as a means to 
40 
 
resolve category uncertainty (Noseworthy et al., 2011). This finding fits with evidence 
that a normative expectation for a product within a particular consumption setting can 
lead to comparative contrast effects (Stapel, Koomen, & Velthuijsen, 1998). Given that 
contrasting information is a more involved process than assimilating information (Stapel 
& Marx, 2006), and given that greater involvement can make individuals focus on 
nonalignable attributes (i.e., the attributes in the target that are missing or absent in the 
surrounding products; Zhang & Markman, 2001), it seems plausible that the very act of 
contrasting a new hybrid product against competing products may not only dictate 
consumers’ classification judgments, but it will put more emphasis on the attributes that 
make the product different or unique (i.e., the supplementary attributes).  
What does this mean for the Apple iWatch? Superior wristwatch attributes may be 
far more salient when the iWatch is seen among mp3 players. If so, this finding would 
directly challenge the fundamental prediction of the single category belief problem (i.e., 
that attributes from the supplementary category will go ignored; Rajagopal & Burnkrant, 
2009). This is important because a significant amount of time and money is spent on 
product design, and if context can influence category inferences as well as attribute 
preference, then where consumers see a new hybrid product may be just as important. 
The goal of study 2 is to test this, and in doing so, pit the strength of contextual activation 
against yet another favoured category cue: the product label (Moreau et al., 2001b).   
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Chapter 4  
 
4 Study 2: Context Influences Attribute Preference 
 
One of the fundamental predictions of the single category belief problem is that 
once the consumer categorizes the hybrid product, attributes from the category that does 
not frame the base referent (i.e., the supplementary category) will go ignored (Rajagopal 
& Burnkrant, 2009). This would indeed be a major marketing challenge, if it were true. 
However, researchers have yet to test this. This prediction is based on the unfettered faith 
that inferences predict preference. Yet we know this is not always true. The problem with 
exploring single category beliefs is that participants are often explicitly asked to 
categorize the hybrid product. Hence, the practice forces a commitment that favours the 
proposition. Indeed, it would be difficult to observe multiple category beliefs in a 
scenario where you are asked to commit to just one. This is why researchers have begun 
to challenge the veracity of single category beliefs, arguing that people are quite open to 
using multiple category inferences when they are aware of the costs of not considering 
the properties from all categories, and when they are not explicitly asked to categorize the 
object (Hayes & Newell, 2009). What is interesting about this challenge is it fits quite 
well with consumer choice. Consumers are not forced to categorize a product, and most 
consumers are well aware of the costs of choosing one product over another, particularly 
when it comes to feature availability or price.  
One way to get around the problem of preferences being confounded by explicit 
categorization is through a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE). DCE allows researchers 
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to infer the value consumers place on various attributes without asking the participant to 
make any explicit evaluative judgment about the product (Louviere, Hensher, & Swait, 
2000). In essence, the point of DCE is not to infer what a product is, but to estimate 
preference based on what it offers. A typical DCE consists of a set of choice scenarios 
that describe a selection of products, and participants are asked to state the most preferred 
product in each set (Louviere, Islam, Wasi, Street, & Burgess, 2008; Street & Burgess, 
2007). Products are described by a combination of attributes and levels assigned by the 
researcher based on the experimental design. By including competing alternatives, DCE 
incorporates the context of consumption.  
Consider, for example, if you were to see LG’s new Hifi (a hybrid 
headphone/cellphone combo) in a high-end consumer audio store. You may find more 
utility in an attribute that relates to noise cancellation than text messaging. However, 
consider the exact same product in a cellphone kiosk at your local mall, and you may see 
more utility in text messaging than noise cancellation. Beyond the theoretical 
implication, this is of great practical relevance. DCE is one the few academic tools to 
transfer into practical use. Hence, the observation of contextual variability in DCE would 
be of utmost importance to marketers testing new products.   
An additional benefit of using DCE is that it is believed to have high external 
validity given it simulates virtually all aspects of the real market (Louviere & 
Woodworth, 1983). In this respect DCE is quite optimal for exploring hybrid products 
because it allows for the co-occurrence of multiple categories, making the trade-off 
among features more salient. A final benefit of DCE is that preferences towards a product 
can be further decoupled into preferences towards attributes (Louviere & Woodworth, 
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1983). The link between consumer inferences and preferences has been surprisingly 
absent in the literature on product categorization. If preference is the direct determinant 
of purchase behaviour, as many researchers believe, then this omission is not trivial. 
Exhibit 2 presents the core hypotheses that underlie the proposition that context 
influences attribute preference (P2).     
 
Exhibit 2: Proposition #2 – Context Influences Attribute Preference 
 
    
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants & Design 
Participants (N = 132; 39% females; Mage = 28.6) were recruited through mall 
intercept, and paid $10 for participating in the study. Each participant was randomly 
assigned to one of three in-store context conditions. The choice task was nested within an 
ad context manipulation, resulting in a 3 (ad context: cellular display vs. headphone 
 
SUMMARY OF STUDY 2 CORE HYPOTHESES 
 
2.1 Category Activation. When the physical context favours one particular category of a 
hybrid product, participants will be more likely to make category judgments that 
support the context, even if those judgments are antithetical to the product’s label. 
 
2.2 Elaborative Processing.  When the physical context favours one particular category 
of a hybrid product, participants will contrast (as opposed to assimilate) the hybrid 
product against the context as a means of making sense of it. 
 
2.3 Attribute Preference. When the physical context favours one particular category of a 
hybrid product, participants will see more utility in the attributes from the 
supplementary category than from the category that matches the context.* 
 
* = Directly challenges the single category belief problem 
44 
 
display vs. ambiguous display) × 2^7 (choice task: seven attributes with two levels each) 
mixed design. Unlike study 1, an ambiguous condition was included in the analysis. This 
not only served to offer a control condition for comparative purposes, but it also lent 
confidence that any observed changes in attribute preference were the result of the 
context manipulation, and not the method. 
The target product chosen was LG’s new Hifi concept (a headphone/cell phone 
hybrid; see Appendix B). The LG Hifi was selected because it has the unique capability 
of morphing to represent the physical form of either a headphone or a cellular phone. 
This allowed the product to be depicted as a hybrid product without explicitly stating it 
was a hybrid or listing hybrid attributes on the packaging. Hence, I could examine the 
influence of a category label while controlling for other confounding cues (e.g., 
perceptual similarity, Gregan-Paxton et al., 2005; or dominant associations with key 
attributes, Noseworthy & Goode, 2011).  
 
4.1.2 Procedures & Dependent Measures 
Participants were randomly assigned research booklets. Each booklet contained a 
photograph of one of the three in-store displays, purportedly taken from somewhere in 
the mall (a guise). A depiction of the packaging for the LG Hifi appeared on the adjacent 
page. The LG was introduced as “the next innovation in Cell Phones.” The cellular label 
was chosen because the cellular depiction of the Hifi was not as intuitive as the 
headphone depiction (see Appendix B). Hence, the label reinforced the Hifi was hybrid 
while testing for the labeling effect. Participants were simply asked to imagine 
approaching the particular display (on the left page) and seeing the new LG Hifi (on the 
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right page). Nothing else varied across the conditions. Once participants viewed the 
product and contextual photos, they then transitioned to the discrete choice task followed 
by the questionnaire. 
Unlike in study 1, it would have been inappropriate to measure schema activation 
via the store-layout classification task because the in-store display (the photographs) 
would have confounded the classification (i.e., it would have gave participants the 
location). Hence, the classification task was replaced with similarity judgments (1 = not 
at all similar; 9 = extremely similar; Noseworthy et al., 2010), which separately 
measured how closely participants perceived the LG Hifi fit the cellphone and headphone 
concepts. Given that similarity estimates are not conceptually distinct from measures of 
perceived typicality, replacing the classification task with similarity judgments not only 
offered insight into category activation, but it also allowed for a conceptual replication of 
the contextual influence on perceived typicality (study 1).  
In addition to the choice task and similarity judgments, participants were asked to 
list as many thoughts as they could about the target product (Malaviya et al. 1996). A 
two-minute time limit was imposed to increase the likelihood of capturing only the most 
accessible thoughts (Cacioppo & Petty, 1981). Participants’ thoughts were coded by two 
judges who were unaware of the research hypotheses. The judges were instructed to rate 
any thoughts that relate to the product’s features (e.g., “I like that the LG has noise 
cancelation abilities”) as item-specific, and rate any thoughts that relate the product to 
other products or a specific convention (e.g., “the LG made me think of listening to music 
on my way home from work”) as relational. All outstanding disagreements between the 
two judges were resolved through discussion. Although the thought task offers some 
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insight into the underlying mechanism, merely knowing whether people focused on 
attributional or relational properties does little to infer the cause of any shift in attribute 
preference. For this, the judges were required to go one step further.  
Researchers have recently made the empirical distinction between two sub-types of 
relational processing: (1) similarity-focused relational elaboration (identifying 
commonalities among objects) and (2) dissimilarity-focused relational elaboration 
(contrasting disparities between objects; Kim & Meyers-Levy, 2008; Noseworthy et al., 
2011). Hence, in addition to coding for item-specific and relational thoughts, the two 
judges further coded whether respondents were dissimilarity-focused (e.g., “The LG has 
network capabilities whereas other headphones don’t”) or similarity-focused (e.g., 
“Nowadays all headphones have noise cancellation”). The reason this was important is 
because similarity-focused thoughts indicate processing is being driven by an 
assimilation effect, whereas dissimilarity-focused thoughts indicate processing is being 
driven by a contrast effect. Hence, if people assimilate new hybrid products with the 
surrounding context, their preferences should align with their single category beliefs (this 
would support the single category belief problem). However, if people contrast new 
hybrid products against the surrounding context, their preferences should be antithetical 
to their classification judgments.  
 
4.1.3 Estimating the Choice Model 
The conceptual basis for estimating DCE is random utility theory (RUT; Manski, 
1977). RUT argues that each individual holds latent preferences (utilities) associated with 
all choice options. Individuals maximize utility by choosing their most preferred option. 
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Latent preferences are specified by two components (an observed and unobserved 
component). This is where it gets a bit technical. Different discrete choice models are 
derived from different assumptions about the unobserved component. The best known 
model is the conditional multinomial logit model (MNL; McFadden, 1974), which 
assumes the unobserved component is independent and identically distributed across 
choices and individuals. In this model, the latent utility of option i, judged by respondent 
n, is as follows:           
                  
         Uni = β′Xni + εni                                                        (1) 
 
Where Xni is the vector of attributes of option i, and β is a vector of parameters 
representing the preference (i.e., weight) associated with each attribute. By assuming εni 
to be the independent and identically distributed (iid) extreme value, McFadden (1974) 
showed that the choice probability from a total of J options is:  
 (2) 
         
 
It is important to recognize that the MNL model parameters in equation (1), βMNL, 
are not the true underlying β in Uni. As is the case for all choice models, the estimates are 
confounded with σε, the standard deviation of the error distribution (McFadden, 1974). 
Thus, one actually estimates β* = λβ, where λ is commonly referred to as “the scale 
∑
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parameter.” The MNL model normalizes (or “scales”) the utility function by a factor of λ 
(λ > 0) so that the variance of the unobserved portion equals π2/6, and the resulting 
relationship is λ = π/(sqrt(6) σε). 
However, due to the restrictive assumptions that (i) the εnj are iid and (ii) tastes for 
observed attributes are homogenous, MNL imposes a very specific structure on how 
changes in elements of xni can affect choice probabilities. Unlike the MNL, mixed logit 
models (MIXL; Revelt & Train, 1998) account for unobserved heterogeneous tastes over 
the observed product attributes. In MIXL, one allows the preference parameters β* to 
vary between individual consumers, but restricts the scale parameter to λ = 1 for all 
consumers. It is still possible to misinterpret differences in the true underlying β between 
classes, which may be due only to differences in λ (Louviere, 2001). Scale heterogeneity 
models (S-MNL) takes into account choice variability (i.e. scale differences) but do not 
accommodate unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. To remedy this, Fiebig et al. 
(2010) recently proposed a new approach to modeling heterogeneity, the Generalized 
Multinomial Logit Model (G-MNL), which stays within the classical framework and 
retains the simplicity of MIXL, but extends to accommodate both scale and taste 
heterogeneity.2 Hence, I adopted this model for study 2. 
 
                                                 
2
 Taste heterogeneity (or preference heterogeneity) is the unobserved individual differences in preferences, 
whereas scale heterogeneity is the variance of the unobserved component (or variation in choice outcomes) 
that is not explained by the systematic component or taste heterogeneity. 
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4.1.4 Selecting Attributes 
A pre-test was conducted (n = 50) to determine the attributes that best represent the 
headphone and cellphone categories. Participants were asked to compare groups of 
attributes (collected from internet retail websites like www.bestbuy.com) and to indicate 
which attribute is most important and which one is least important. The technique, 
referred to as best-worst scaling (Finn & Louviere, 1992), involves calculating the 
number of times each attribute is rated as most important and subtracting it from the 
number of times the same attribute is rated least important. The combined results lend 
insight into the relative importance of each attribute.  
The top three headphone attributes (sound quality, noise cancelling ability, and 
surround sound) and the top three cell phone attributes (camera resolution, network 
capability, and display type), along with price, framed the seven features to be varied in 
the DCE. Once the features were selected, two attribute levels (e.g., camera resolution: 
6mp vs. 10mp) were chosen from the most common variations in current production 
(taken from retail websites such as www.bestbuy.com). For the detailed description of the 
attributes and their respective levels, see Table 2). 
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   Table 2: Key Attributes and Attribute Levels Used in Study 2 
Features Descriptions of Features Levels 
Price  
 
 
$60 or $80 
Headphone 
Sound Quality 
 
Sound quality is gauged through parameters such as clarity of the sound, sharpness of 
the sound, the balance of the sound, and the supported sound range. 
 
Moderate or 
Good 
 
Headphone 
Noise Cancellation 
Noise cancellation helps hush ambient noise by creating anti-noise that obviates the 
noise at your ear. It doesn’t eliminate noise entirely, but the better models significantly 
reduce ambient noise, like the whoosh of jet planes' air conditioning systems. 
 
No or 
Yes 
 
Headphone 
Surround Sound 
True surround sound headphones create a more spacious sound than conventional 
stereo headphones. 
 
Conventional 
or True Surround
Cell Phone  
Camera Resolution 
 
Most new cell phones include a built-in camera that works the same as a regular 
digital camera. Camera resolution is commonly rated in mega-pixels (mps), with 
higher mps leading to cleaner and crisper images. 
 
6mp or 
10mp 
 
Cell Phone 
Network Capability 
Network capability refers to 2G (second generation) and 3G (third generation) data-
transmission speeds -- with 3G being generally faster than 2G.  
 
2G or 
3G 
Cell Phone 
Display Type 
 
Most cell phones have a monochrome display (16 grays), but there are a growing 
number that have true color. Cell phones with true color screens tend to be brighter 
and clearer than the traditional monochrome display. 
 
Monochrome or 
True Color 
Note.—Participants read these key attributes prior to engaging in the choice task. 
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To generate the discrete choice design, we followed the procedures laid out by 
Green (1974). First, I generated 16 choice options from the 2^7 attribute combinations 
using an orthogonal main effect plan (OMEP). I then used a balanced incomplete block 
design (BIBD) to put the 16 choice combinations into 20 choice sets. In each choice set, 
participants were asked to consider four different Hifi concepts under the guise that LG is 
currently testing various versions prior to release. This allowed me to hold brand and 
aesthetic appearance constant, and thus get at a true estimate of attribute preference. 
Hence, the choice context was incidental in that participants were not required to choose 
among the products seen in the display. This afforded the ability to test whether the mere 
exposure to surrounding products altered attribute preference.  
The order of the 20 choice sets was established through a Latin square design. For 
each of the 20 scenarios, respondents were simply asked to indicate, “Which of the LG 
Hifi models would you be most likely to choose?” I excluded the no-choice option to 
engage participants in more thoughtful decision making and to alleviate any identification 
issues that may occur if a high proportion of participants exercise the option not to 
choose (Park, Ding, & Rao, 2008; but see Dhar & Simonson, 2003). 
 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Schema Activation (Similarity Judgments) 
Overall, there was a main effect of context on participants’ judgments of cellphone 
similarity, F(2, 129) = 12.92, p < .001, and headphone similarity, F(2, 129) = 18.08, p < 
.001. Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants’ perceptions of cellphone similarity 
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did not differ between the cellular display (M = 6.07) and the ambiguous display (M = 
5.87; Tukey’s HSD, p > .70). However, participants believed the LG Hifi was more 
similar to the cellular concept when seen alongside the cellular display than the 
headphone display (MCellular = 6.07 vs. MHeadphone = 4.52; p < .001). Similarly, 
participants’ perceptions of headphone similarity did not differ between the cellular 
display (M = 3.16) and the ambiguous display (M = 3.59; Tukey’s HSD, p > .80). 
However, participants believed the LG Hifi was more similar to the headphone concept 
when seen alongside a headphone display rather than the cellular display (MHeadphone = 
5.16 vs. MCellular = 3.16; p < .001). As expected, when participants’ similarity judgments 
were indexed, such that the headphone similarity was subtracted from cellphone 
similarity and then divided by the sum of the two, the correlation between the resulting 
similarity index and functional index (calculated in the same manner as study 1) was 
positive and significant, r = .22, p < .01. Hence, people not only saw the Hifi as more 
similar to its surrounding context, but they adjusted their functional expectations 
accordingly. These findings support hypothesis 2.1. 
 
4.2.2 Type of Elaborative Processing 
 
Two unaffiliated coders (intercoder reliability = .87) classified participants’ 
thoughts as either item-specific or relational, and if relational, they further classified the 
thoughts as either dissimilarity-focused or similarity-focused. Overall, there was a main 
effect of advertising context on type of elaborative processing, F(2, 129) = 21.10, p < 
.001. The cellular display led to more relational elaboration (M = -.14) and the ambiguous 
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display led to more item-specific elaboration (M = .08; Tukey’s HSD, p < .001). 
Likewise, the headphone display led to more relational elaboration than the ambiguous 
display (MHeadphone = -.07 vs. MAmbiguous = .08; p < .005). The cellular and headphone 
display conditions did not significantly differ (p > .20; though directionally favouring the 
cellular display, which would support the strength of the labeling effect).  
When relational elaboration was subdivided into dissimilarity-focused and 
similarity-focused thoughts, the results confirmed that 71% of relational thoughts were 
dissimilarity-focused in nature. When the dissimilarity-focused thoughts about the 
supplementary attributes were removed from the cumulative count of relational 
elaboration, the influence of context on type of elaborative processing fell to non-
significance (p > .40). In support of hypothesis 2.2, these results suggest that it was 
indeed a contrast effect driving participants’ processing. This should be reflected in 
attribute preference. 
 
4.2.3 Shift in Attribute Preference 
 
As mentioned, attribute preference coefficients for this study were estimated using 
the Generalized Multinomial Logit Model (G-MNL; see Fiebig et al., 2010). In the G-
MNL, the utility to person n from choosing alternative j on the purchase occasion (or in 
the choice scenario) t is calculated as follows:  
 
                             Unjt = [σnβ + γηn + (1 - γ)σnηn] xnjt + εnjt                                                     (3) 
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Where γ is a parameter between 0 and 1, σn is the random variable that captures 
scale heterogeneity, ηn is the random variable that captures taste heterogeneity, xnjt is a 
vector of observed attributes of alternative j, β is a vector of utility weights (homogenous 
across consumers), and εnjt —referred to as the independent identical distributed (iid) 
extreme value—is the idiosyncratic error.  
G-MNL nests the multinomial logit model (MNL), the taste heterogeneity model 
(MIXL), the scale heterogeneity model (S-MNL), and two versions of G-MNL (GMNL-I 
and GMNL-II) by the parameter γ. In order to impose the restriction that γ must lie 
between 0 and 1, Fiebig et al. (2010) use a logistic transform, γ = exp(γ*)/[1+ exp(γ*)], 
and estimate the parameter γ*.  The parameter γ governs how the variance of residual 
taste heterogeneity varies with scale heterogeneity in a model that includes both. The 
scale heterogeneity parameter σn is positive, as it represents the consumer’s specific 
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic error. It is operationalized as a log normal 
distribution with mean 1 and standard deviation τ, or LN(1, τ2). Thus, τ is the key 
parameter that indicates if scale heterogeneity is present in the data. By accounting for 
both preference (taste) and scale heterogeneity, the G-MNL offers the most optimal 
estimates of attribute preferences. 
Before examining the effect of in-store display on attribute preference, I used a 
likelihood-ratio test (LRT) to check whether preference coefficients varied by display. 
The LRT explores whether the three displays share the same population parameters (i.e., 
whether headphone, cellphone, and ambiguous displays led to relatively consistent 
preferences). I compared the log likelihoods of the pooled model, Log L = -2383.20, 
param. = 16, with the separate coefficient estimates from the three display conditions, 
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Log L = -2274.14, param. = 44. The results revealed significant difference in perceived 
utility across the three displays, LRT(28) = 218.12, p < .001.3 The results of the G-MNL 
estimates along with model fit for the various nested models are summarized in Table 3.   
Table 3: GMNL Model Estimates and Model Fit for Study 2 
 Feature Levels Mean Estimates Standard Dev. Estimates 
  β SE(β) t-ratios    η SE(η) t-ratios 
Cellular Price -0.06 0.02 -2.80 0.10 0.03 3.82 
Display Headphone Sound Quality 1.46 0.31 4.77 1.34 0.24 5.50 
Headphone Noise Control 0.91 0.23 4.00 1.01 0.29 3.44 
Headphone Surround Sound 0.90 0.19 4.76 0.20 0.16 1.25 
Cellphone Camera Res. 0.14 0.06 2.24 0.13 0.14 0.93 
Cellphone Network 2.08 0.24 8.85 1.04 0.22 4.80 
Cellphone Display Type 0.43 0.18 2.44 0.67 0.14 4.68 
Headphone  Price -0.11 0.02 -5.02 0.07 0.02 4.47 
Display Headphone Sound Quality 0.69 0.15 4.79 0.51 0.21 2.40 
Headphone Noise Control 0.59 0.13 4.41 0.00 0.18 0.00 
Headphone Surround Sound 0.30 0.07 4.06 0.55 0.16 3.52 
Cellphone Camera Res. 0.59 0.17 3.47 0.26 0.15 1.78 
Cellphone Network 2.45 0.34 7.14 1.20 0.42 2.88 
Cellphone Display Type 0.65 0.17 3.74 0.51 0.16 3.17 
Ambiguous Price -0.03 0.02 -1.86 0.08 0.02 4.54 
Display Headphone Sound Quality 0.52 0.16 3.37 0.22 0.19 1.17 
Headphone Noise Control 0.35 0.11 3.32 0.16 0.13 1.28 
Headphone Surround Sound 0.14 0.18 0.77 0.65 0.15 4.34 
Cellphone Camera Res. 0.62 0.22 2.79 0.79 0.27 2.88 
Cellphone Network 1.64 0.24 6.98 1.07 0.30 3.60 
Cellphone Display Type 0.53 0.11 4.84 0.16 0.08 1.96 
 
τ 0.94 0.10 9.20    
γ
* 
-2.50 1.43 -1.75    
        
  MNL S-MNL MIXL G-MNL   
Model Fit Parameters (P) 21 22 42 44   
 Log L -2609.0 -2502.3 -2315.6 -2274.1   
 BIC* 5297.9 5088.4 4791.1 4715.8   
 AIC** 5260.0 5048.7 4715.3 4636.3   
*
 BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion ( -2 Log L + 2 P); 
**AIC: Akaike Information Criterion ( -2 Log L +  P log n), where n is sample size. 
                                                 
3
 I simultaneously estimated the data from the three context conditions by stacking the design matrix (i.e. 
attributes) in block diagonal where off diagonal elements are zero.  In this way, differences in both taste 
and scale heterogeneity across the three contexts were accounted for in the G-MNL. I thank Dr. Nada Wasi 
for providing access to the MATLAB program used to estimate the G-MNL model in Fiebig et al., 2010. 
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The model fit measures (Log Likelihood, AIC and BIC) all favour the G-MNL over 
its nested counterparts of MNL, S-MNL, and MIXL. The preference estimates for the 
superior attributes (including price) have the expected signs and most are significant. The 
significant scale parameter, τ = .94; t = 9.20, and significant standard deviation estimates 
(η) imply there is a substantial amount of scale and taste heterogeneity in the data. The 
direction of γ* estimates (i.e. -2.50) indicates the variance of taste heterogeneity varies 
with scale. Hence, as expected, the G-MNL was the most optimal to test whether attribute 
preference varied by in-store context. 
I used the Wald statistic to test whether the shift in preference for the combined 
attributes was statistically different from zero. The Wald test statistic was calculated as 
follows: 
 
                         W = (R|β^ |-r)′[R VCOV(β^ )R′]-1(R|β^ |-r)~χ2q                                          (4) 
 
Where R is a q × k matrix of restrictions, q is the number of restrictions (here q = 
1), k is number of parameters in the restriction, VCOV is variance-covariance matrix of β^
, and r in our case is 0. Given that the LG Hifi possesses six functional attributes, three 
from the headphone category and three from the cellphone category, the key theoretical 
contrasts were to explore the combined preference for the mp3 attributes and the 
combined preference for the wristwatch attributes across the three ad contexts. Consider, 
for example, one of the key restriction coefficients for the headphone attributes, R(1 1 1 -
1 -1 -1). The three 1s are for the combined preference of the headphone attributes when 
the LG Hifi is seen in the headphone display, and the three -1s are for the combined 
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preference of the headphone attributes when the LG Hifi is seen in the ambiguous display 
(the control). The null hypothesis is simply, R|β^| = 0.  
As expected, the preference structures between the three in-store display 
conditions differed. The combined preference for the cellphone attributes was highest, 
when the LG Hifi was seen alongside a headphone display relative to the ambiguous 
display, R|β^ |= .90; W = 3.37, p = .07, or the cellular display, R|β^|= 1.03; W = 5.08, p < 
.05. Conversely, the combined preference for the headphone attributes was highest when 
the LG Hifi was seen alongside a cellphone display relative to the ambiguous display, 
R|β^|= 2.26; W = 20.83, p < .005, or the headphone display, R|β^|= 1.69; W = 12.85, p < 
.01. As expected, the effect did not manifest in the ambiguous (control) condition. People 
predictably used the product’s label to infer that the LG Hifi was more similar to a 
cellphone (M = 5.87) than a pair of headphones (M = 3.59, p < .001), and consequently, 
they reported greater preference for the product’s primary (alignable) cellular attributes, 
R|β^|= 1.79; W = 17.61, p < .001.  
These findings confirm that as long as there is a context that affords a category 
cue, consumers will prefer superior attributes more when they were supplementary than 
when they aligned with the primary category belief. However, when a hybrid product is 
stripped from its normative context (as is commonly done when researchers explore new 
hybrid products), the link between single category inferences and attribute preference 
(i.e., the single category belief problem) is quite robust. Hence, whether single category 
beliefs will lead people to ignore attributes from a product’s supplementary category 
depends to a large extend on the external context. In fact, by supporting hypothesis 2.3, 
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the results of this study question the robustness of the single category belief problem in a 
consumption environment where competition is ever present.  
 
4.3 Discussion 
 
Consistent with the literature on single category beliefs, the results of study 2 
confirm that consumers tend to make classification judgments and generate inferences for 
new hybrid products in line with only a single category. The results extend this 
observation by confirming that context plays a major role in whether these inferences will 
translate into preference. Contrary to the prediction that consumers will ignore attributes 
from the category that does not frame the single category belief (i.e., the supplementary 
category), this work suggests that as long as there is a means of relative comparison, 
superior attributes will be preferred more when they are supplementary than when they 
align with the primary category. What is particularly notable is the strength of this effect. 
The influence of the in-store placement on predicting the single category referent 
overrode even the product’s explicit label (Moreau et al., 2001b). This suggests that an 
in-store display can significantly alter attribute preference for new hybrid products. These 
findings have important implications for theory and practice, particularly given that in-
store placement is at least somewhat under the marketer’s control.  
From a theoretical perspective, study 2 extends our understanding for when and 
why consumers will focus on nonalignable differences. Most notably, there has been 
increased interest in examining the influence of add-on extensions (e.g., adding an 
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external hard-drive to an existing computer platform). Bertini, Ofek, and Ariely (2009) 
found that alignable add-ons tend to decrease consumers’ evaluations of a base product 
because these attributes indicate the product could have been better in the first place. 
Conversely, positive nonalignable add-ons increase consumers’ evaluations of the base 
product because these add-ons indicate positive latent functionality. Although Bertini et 
al. did not directly explore multiple-category inferences or context effects, their findings 
share important parallels with the current work.  
Like an add-on, which is an extra feature, benefit, or device that one can purchase 
in addition to the target product, a hybrid product offers additional benefits and features 
that are not traditionally associated with a single base referent. However, unlike with ad-
ons, the additional features and benefits of a hybrid product are combined during product 
development, and as such, the base referent is often not so clear once the product hits the 
market (Moreau et al. 2001b). As discussed, this initial ambiguity is believed to result in 
category uncertainty (Gregan-Paxton et al., 2005). The single category belief problem is 
believed to manifest from consumers attempting to overcome this uncertainty 
(Noseworthy & Goode, 2011; Rajagopal & Burnkrant, 2009). What Bertini et al. offer is 
some insight into what may occur when the base referent is set and when there is no 
ambiguity. This is where the role of context comes in.  
Where the current work makes a significant departure from Bertini et al. (2009) is 
in the argument that hybrid products do not augment preference because hybrid 
functionality is latent, but because attribute preference is relative and context dependent. 
As Bertini et al. note, an important extension of their work is exploring how competition 
influences preference for alignable versus nonalignable differences. The authors also 
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highlight the need to address what happens when alignable and nonalignable differences 
co-occur (as is common with hybrid products). Study 2 addresses both calls. Yet, where 
Bertini et al. speculate that alignable attributes may have greater impact on consumer 
judgments when alignable and nonalignable differences co-occur, this work finds that 
nonalignable supplementary attributes have greater impact on preference. 
Marketers could benefit from this knowledge by strategically placing a new hybrid 
product in a context that optimizes attribute preference. In a sense, this evidence goes 
against common intuition that marketers should position a product in accordance with its 
strengths. On the contrary, the current research suggests that if a new hybrid product has 
superior attributes that fit one category and standard attributes that fit another, marketers 
may be better off placing the product in a context that activates the standard category, and 
allow the superior attributes to standout. This is particularly noteworthy given the vast 
commercial use of conjoint-based techniques. Hence, the results of this study have 
significant implications for marketers involved in product testing and development. 
Marketers may want to consider testing new hybrid products in a variety of contexts prior 
to release. 
When we take study 1 and study 2 together we can see something rather interesting. 
Study 1 showed that people favour a product’s consistency or fit (e.g., when the brand 
matched the imagery in the ad, people liked the product more); however, study 2 showed 
people favour product attributes more when they did not fit. These results may seem 
conflicting, but at the aggregate level they are not. In both studies, the context (be it 
thematic imagery or the in-store display) predicted the single category belief. At the 
aggregate level (i.e., preference for the product), the overall beta-weights in study 2 (as 
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depicted in the β column in Table 2) favoured the label. Hence, not only was the label 
indeed a strong category cue, but it once again demonstrated that preferences can be 
augmented by fit (people liked the product more when its superior attributes fit the label). 
This fits with study 1. What is important, however, is that preferences were shifted by the 
supplementary attributes. Hence, supplementary attributes were not ignored, as the single 
category belief problem predicts.  
So why has this effect not been realized in prior work? Put simply, researchers tend 
not to disaggregate the preference for features from the overall preference for the product 
because it is quite difficult to do (hence, the use of DCE). It is not that single category 
beliefs are overstated, but that researchers should be cautious when estimating the link 
between inferences and attribute preference. Inferences (i.e., category beliefs) and 
preference need not align. This is one of the several reasons why we tend to see such poor 
correlations between product evaluations and purchase intent. Unfortunately, this is not 
the only methodological limitation that has led to erroneous implications in prior 
research. This brings us to study 3. 
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Chapter 5  
 
5 Study 3: Context Influences Perceptions of Proto-
typicality  
 
Mandler (1982) argued, “schemas are representations of experience that guide 
action, perception, and thought [italics added]” (p. 3). Product schemas tend to develop 
from repeat exposure to a particular product within a particular context. The resulting 
familiarity allows expectations to guide inferences about the product’s functionality and 
intent. Hence, it seems reasonable that perceptions of proto-typicality (i.e., judgments of 
fit) should vary by context. If so, this would be quite problematic for researchers 
exploring the moderate incongruity effect or single category beliefs, particularly given 
that past manipulations have examined ambiguous products in the absence of contextual 
influence, and given that researchers tend to use typicality judgments as a means to 
establish their manipulations. Such examinations, though informative, are restrictive in 
that they account only for the exposure to the product category and not to the context 
where the product is observed. Of course a new product may pretest as moderately 
incongruent (e.g., a new weird-looking cellphone), but this does not mean it will be 
perceived this way in its normative context (e.g., a cellular kiosk at the mall). 
I argue that neglecting the natural context of consumption forces individuals to 
draw inferences based solely on perceptual similarity—there really is nothing else. Thus, 
the claim that visual perception dominates product categorization may be grossly 
overstated. Indeed, evidence from studies 1 and 2 would support this prediction. 
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Perceptual identity is but one aspect that informs categorization. As mentioned, what the 
object relates to is just as important in saying what the object is, if not more so, given that 
it accounts for the category, the context, and the interaction between the two (Estes et al., 
2011). The goal of study 3 is to demonstrate that the practice of removing product stimuli 
from their surrounding context can bias proto-typicality estimates, making some products 
seem more atypical than they naturally would be. Exhibit 3 presents the formal 
hypotheses that underlie the proposition that context influences perceptions of proto-
typicality (P3). 
 
Exhibit 3: Proposition #3 – Context Influences Perceptions of Proto-typicality 
 
SUMMARY OF STUDY 3 CORE HYPOTHESES 
 
3.1 Product Evaluations. Participants will evaluate a hybrid product more favourably 
when there is a contextual cue that thematically links the hybrid product with 
disparate products, than when there is no contextual cue present. 
 
3.2 Perceived Typicality. Participants will perceive a hybrid product to be more typical 
when there is a contextual cue that thematically links the hybrid product to disparate 
products, than when there is no contextual cue present. 
 
3.3  Elaborative Processing. Participants will be more likely to engage in relational 
processing when there is a contextual cue that thematically links the hybrid product to 
disparate products, than when there is no contextual cue present. 
 
3.4 Functional Associations.  Participants will be more likely to trade-off functional 
features that fit the context when there is a contextual cue that thematically links the 
hybrid product to disparate products, than when there is no contextual cue present. 
 
3.5 Post-test Results.  The effects of a contextual cue on category inferences will persist 
over time. Specifically, following a lengthy delay, participants’ classification 
judgments (in terms of speed and categorization) will be biased in favour of a prior 
contextual cue, and this will lead to predictable errors in recall (indicating thematic 
processing persists over time). 
 
64 
 
5.1 Method 
5.1.1 Participants & Design 
Undergraduate students (N = 180; 56% female; Mage = 19.7) participated in this 
study in exchange for course credit. The sample requirement was estimated based on the 
standard significance criterion (α = .05), power (1 - β = .80), and an a priori effect size 
estimation (f = .25; Cohen, 1988). The sample worked out to be 30 participants per cell 
(rounded up considering some of the smaller effects in study 1). The product chosen for 
this study was Vuzix’s new sunglasses-mp3 combo (see appendix C). The Vuzix’s hybrid 
was chosen because of its high degree of ambiguity. Specifically, its perceptual similarity 
supports the sunglasses category, whereas its conceptual functionality supports both the 
sunglasses and the mp3 player categories. A pretest (n = 32) confirmed that when all ad 
information was stripped away and nothing else accompanied the Vusix other than a 
blank white background, 77% of participants categorized the Vusix as a pair of 
sunglasses, 17% said it was an mp3 player, and the remaining 6% were undecided. 
Hence, consistent with predictions in marketing that perceptual similarity guides category 
inferences (Gregan-Paxton et al., 2005), people tended to see the Vusix as a pair of 
sunglasses rather than an mp3 player.  
The ad manipulation and dependent measures were administered electronically in a 
behavioural lab. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six experimental 
conditions in a 2 (advertising context: consumer fashion vs. consumer electronics) × 3 
(magazine label: Wired vs. Vogue vs. no label [control]) between-subjects factorial 
design. The primary purpose of the design was to test what would happen if two 
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advertising arrays of four thematically related products were seen in a specific magazine 
that linked the ads through conventional association. Hence, once again, there was a fit 
condition, whereby the magazine label and advertising context could either unite around 
the perceptual category (sunglasses) or the conceptual category (mp3 players). This of 
course allowed for two mismatched conditions, whereby the magazine label and 
contextual arrays were at odds, as well as a control condition where there was no 
contextual cue to unite the array. The idea is that, participants’ perceptions of typicality 
would vary by the contextual match.  
Beyond the theoretical contribution, the secondary purpose of this study design was 
to show how the current practices of removing products from their normative context can 
bias results. To accomplish this, the control condition served to replicate the common 
practice of showing the product in isolation from other products. The general prediction 
was that doing so would bias responses in favour of perceptual similarity, but also put a 
downward bias on estimates of perceived typicality (i.e., make the product seem more 
atypical) because there is nothing to facilitate the product’s membership. Hence, the 
design served two purposes: (1) it explored the influence of contextual match on 
perceptions of proto-typicality, and (2) it highlighted how the common experimental 
practice of removing new product stimuli from their natural context may be leading 
researchers to rather tenuous and/or lab specific effects.  
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5.1.2 Stimuli Construction 
 
Unlike study 1 and 2, which operationalized context via associative imagery and 
the physical store layout, this study explored yet another type of context: the ad 
composition (henceforth referred to as the ad array). As mentioned previously, it is well 
documented that ads for several unrelated products versus ads for several competing 
products will differentially influence processing (Malaviya, 2007; Malaviya et al., 1996). 
Specifically, a series of unrelated ads encourages people to focus on feature information, 
whereas a series of competing ads (i.e., ads for products from the same category) 
encourages people to focus on commonalities or discrepancies among the products 
(Malaviya 2007; Noseworthy et al., 2011).  
To date, researchers exploring the influence of ad composition have yet to consider 
that objects from disparate categories (i.e., unrelated products) can be related, just not in 
the taxonomic sense—they can be thematically related. This is more common that one 
might expect. For example, many specialty magazines (e.g., Hunting and Fishing) show a 
variety of ads that collectively account for the namesake of the publication (e.g., Fishing 
Lures, Compound Bows, etc.). If a marketer were to introduce a new product in this 
magazine they would want to consider that consumers may be predisposed to the context 
(activity). This predisposition could be used to facilitate new product introductions. If so, 
we should see predictable changes in how people process thematically related ads when 
the magazine facilitates the conventional association. 
Cognitive processing in a thematically cued context should more closely resemble 
that of a competing ad context (relational elaboration) as opposed to an unrelated ad 
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context (item-specific elaboration). After all, thematic processing draws conventional 
relationships between two or more otherwise disparate stimuli (Estes et al., 2011; 
Noseworthy et al., 2010). However, without the cue (i.e., the magazine label) to highlight 
the conventional relationship, participants should resort back to item-specific elaboration. 
If so, this would again be of theoretical significance given that magazines of all sorts tend 
to favour a certain activity or genre. Hence, researchers exploring the influence of ad 
arrays may want to consider that most manufacturers put considerable thought into ad 
placement, and because of this, they tend to inadvertently assist in relating disparate 
categories through conventional association.  
The selection of the thematic ad arrays was accomplished in a two stage pre-test. 
The first pretest (n = 44; 50% females) asked participants to identify three disparate 
products (in addition to the target product) that were related in favour of the perceptual 
category (sunglasses), and three disparate products that were related in favour of the 
conceptual category (mp3 player). Sticking with four advertisements to define the 
advertising context was consistent with prior work (Malaviya, 2007; Malaviya et al., 
1996; Noseworthy et al., 2011). Participants were specifically instructed to choose three 
additional products that relate to the target product, which were not from the same 
category, but were commonly seen together in some sort of commercial or consumption-
related scenario (e.g., a certain type of store). They were also asked to report the scenario 
they thought of when listing the related products.  
The results revealed the top three most commonly associated products, in terms of 
frequency and rank (excluding products with intrinsic properties that unite around a 
goal), were laptops, cellphones, and tablets for the mp3 player target (context = consumer 
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electronics store), and bags, running shoes, and wristwatches for the sunglasses target 
(context = consumer apparel/fashion outlet). Of course, one could imagine how some of 
these products may equally relate to both concepts (e.g., running shoes & mp3 player = 
morning run; running shoes & sunglasses = morning run). This made the contextual 
arrays rather conservative, which set a nice foundation to test whether the magazine 
labels could draw out the conventional associations. 
Following the first pretest, a second pretest (n = 52; 50% females) had participants 
read one of the two product lists from pretest 1 that either made up the consumer 
electronics context or the consumer fashion context. After reading one of the product 
lists, participants were asked to name a common magazine that would tend to feature all 
four of the products in any given issue. Once completed, participants were instructed to 
flip the page where they viewed a list of 10 different magazine titles (five technology-
focused and five fashion-focused). Participants were instructed to allocate 100 points 
based on how likely the product list would appear in any of the magazines. So, for 
example, if participants believed the consumer fashion list would most likely be seen in a 
magazine like Cosmopolitan, they could allocate 80 points (or 90) to this magazine, 
leaving 20 points (or 10) to be disbursed among the remaining nine magazines.  
 Beyond identifying the magazine labels for the actual study, pretest 2 lent some 
insight into whether the context adopted by participants in pretest 1 would remain salient 
when the product array was reverse-engineered (i.e., when the array was used to cue the 
context as opposed to the context being used to cue the array). The results were quite 
consistent.  
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The most common magazine titles selected by participants were “Wired Magazine” 
for the consumer electronic list (59%, all other magazines < 14%) and “Vogue Magazine” 
for the consumer fashion list (37%, all other magazines < 25%). Note: the muted 
dominance of Vogue—relative to the selection of Wired Magazine—was due to the fact 
that female respondents reported severe variance in preference for consumer fashion 
magazines (not surprising considering the vast array of options targeted to the 18-20 
female demographic). Nevertheless, the point allocation results from the second half of 
the pretest were quite informative because the task included the two magazines in the 10 
options.  
A repeated measure ANOVA, with the point allocation for the Wired magazine and 
Vogue magazine as the within subject factor and with gender and product listing as 
between subject factors, yielded a significant point allocation × product listing 
interaction, F(1, 48) = 255.27, p < .001. Multivariate simple effects confirmed the nature 
of the interaction was such that when participants were exposed to the consumer 
electronic list, they allocated more points to Wired than to Vogue (M = 59.61 vs. M = 
6.19, p < .001). Similarly, when participants were exposed to the consumer fashion list, 
they allocated more points to Vogue than to Wired (M = 37.65 vs. M = 3.92, p < .001). 
Admittedly, this effect is rather intuitive given the obvious nature of the product listing. 
However, what was important was that the gender × product listing interaction was not 
significant (F < 1), and the three-way interaction among gender, product listing, and point 
allocation was only directional (p = .14). The three-way interaction revealed that the 
point allocation × product listing interaction only slightly varied by gender in that the 
selection for Vogue magazine was stronger for males in the consumer fashion context 
70 
 
(again, not because males prefer Vogue, but because females were far more sporadic 
when allocating points among fashion magazines). Nevertheless, both genders reported 
Wired as an equally unlikely option for the consumer fashion listing.  
Given that pre-test 2 confirmed the relationship between the contextual 
representations (the magazine labels) and the product lists, the product lists were then 
adopted as the foundation for the contextual arrays. To accomplish this, nine real 
advertisements were chosen to represent the three products that appeared in the consumer 
electronics list, the three products that appeared in the consumer fashion list, as well as 
three unrelated products to round out the control condition (see appendix C). The only 
alteration was to photo edit additional claims on to the ads. This served two purposes: (1) 
it allowed for the ability to test participants’ type of processing (i.e., whether they 
clustered the ads relationally or not), and (2) it allowed for a test of whether thematically 
binding disparate ads has any lasting consequence on ad claim recognition. Once 
finalized, the magazine labels and the ad arrays were taken forward into the study. 
 
5.1.3 Procedures & Dependent Measures 
Participants were randomly assigned to read an editorial excerpt from an 
eMagazine (www.emagazines.com). The excerpt was designed so that four ads (i.e., the 
consumer fashion array or the consumer electronics array) would randomly appear as 
participants scrolled through the editorial. In one condition, participants were told that the 
excerpt was taken from the popular magazine Wired. In another condition, participants 
were told the excerpt was taken from the popular magazine Vogue. In the control, 
participants were not informed of the magazine label. The logos for each of the 
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magazines were photo-edited above their respective editorials. In all cases, the excerpt 
was an editorial piece about how clothing retailers are currently using social media like 
Twitter and Facebook to target consumers. This specific editorial was chosen after 
debriefing participants in the two-stage pretest (discussed above). The participants 
indicated that the social media editorial was one of five editorials that would be equally 
likely to be featured in Vogue and Wired (plausibility between labels, p = .53).  
Participants read the editorial and viewed the ads at their own pace. Once finished, 
they were informed that they were going to be asked specific questions about one of the 
four advertisements, chosen at random (a guise). In fact, all participants were asked 
specific questions about the Vusix advertisement. The questionnaire was relatively 
consistent with the instrument used in study 1 with some rather important 
additions/alterations. Specifically, after participants recorded their attitude towards the 
product (i.e., target evaluations) and perceived typicality, a functional association task 
was administered.  
The functional association task required participants to view photographs of 
scenery (sunglasses association) that accompanied select tracks of classical music (mp3 
association). The gradients in brightness of the photographs (ranging from very bright to 
strongly shaded) were designed so that they negatively correlated with the clarity and 
quality of the music tracks. Participants were exposed to six different combinations that 
ranged in terms of how severe the trade-off was between picture brightness and sound 
quality. After going through all six variations, participants were asked to select which of 
the trade-offs best represents the performance they would expect from the target product. 
The idea is that individuals who activated the sunglasses schema will trade-off sound 
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quality for brightness, and those that activated the mp3 schema will trade-off brightness 
for sound quality. This effect should be exacerbated in the label × context fit conditions.  
Following the functional association task, the questionnaire concluded with a free-
recall task. The free-recall task simply instructed participants to list everything they could 
recall about each of the ads they viewed within the array. This allowed for a check of the 
type of processing participants’ employed when viewing the ads. It was predicted that in 
the two contextualized arrays (consumer fashion array and consumer electronics array), 
participants would more likely engage in relational elaboration, whereas in the control 
condition (no label) participants would more likely engage in item-specific elaboration.  
 
5.1.4 Post-test Measures 
After completing the questionnaire, participants were thanked for taking part in the 
study and discharged with a request to return in 30-minutes to sign for participation credit 
(no reference was given to a follow-up task). Upon returning, participants were 
administered a surprise Latency Association Task (LAT; Noseworthy & Goode, 2011). 
The LAT works on the same guiding principles as the Implicit Association Task (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz 1998). Both are an indirect measure of relative strength 
of association between concepts or objects in memory. Hence, it can be used to test 
whether the context effects observed in the first half of the study persist over time. That 
is, if the fit between the magazine label and thematic context predict the classification 
judgments of an ambiguous product, the LAT can tell us whether the association to the 
product category will remain intact when the context is no longer present.  
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Similar to how the IAT requires participants to map items onto two predetermined 
keys on a keyboard (e.g., “A” and “L”), the LAT assigns concepts to specific keys (e.g., 
“A” = sunglasses; “L” = mp3 players). The LAT continuously displays consecutive 
objects in the center of a computer display (in this case, the software randomly displayed 
five different pairs of sunglasses, five different mp3 players, and the Vusix target). The 
LAT is somewhat simpler than the IAT in that participants are merely asked to categorize 
the products as soon as they appear on the screen by pressing the appropriate response 
key that represents the category that best fits the product. Participants should be quicker 
at matching the Vusix target with the mp3 category when they previously saw the Vusix 
advertised in the Wired magazine editorial accompanied by the consumer electronics 
array. Conversely, people will be quicker at matching the Vusix target with the 
sunglasses category when they previously saw the Vusix advertised in the Vogue 
magazine editorial accompanied by the consumer fashion array. Both of these conditions 
should generate faster responses than the two mismatched conditions (i.e., Wired + 
consumer fashion array; Vogue + consumer electronics array).  
The IAT is predicated on the idea that the ease or difficulty with which people are 
able to assign the same response to distinct concepts is taken as a measure of strength of 
the association in memory (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). For example, if this was a true 
IAT, participants might be asked to press ‘A’ with their left hand as quickly as possible 
whenever something that relates to sunglasses or if the brand Oakley appears on the 
screen. Similarly, participants might be asked to press “L” with their right hand whenever 
something relates to mp3 players or the brand Apple. The conditions would then be 
randomized and counterbalanced, thereby creating a reversed trial that can be directly 
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compared to the initial combined task. The LAT differs in that it merely requires 
individuals categorize the product as quickly as possible.  
This should get interesting when we compare the results against the control 
condition. The core prediction for the LAT is that people’s prior schematic activations 
will persist over time. That is, if the first part of the study activated the conceptual 
category, a memory node should be created, and participants should then see the target 
product as more closely associated (as indicated by faster response times) with the mp3 
player category. Conversely, if the first part of the study activated the perceptual 
category, participants should see the target product as more closely associated with the 
sunglasses category. If, however, there was no label in the first half of the study (control), 
participants should be more prone to classify the product as a pair of sunglasses 
(perceptually), but they should not necessarily be as fast doing so as participants in the 
perceptual fit condition. Hence, the first part of the study will dictate participants’ 
memory over time—demonstrating the strength, not only of single category beliefs, but 
also the pitfalls of not taking into account the surrounding context.  
Following the latency association task, participants undertook a cued recall task. 
The task consisted of a list 10 different ad claims, which were displayed on the left side 
of the screen, and the Vusix, with all ad information stripped away, was displayed on the 
right. Participants were required to select which of the claims actually appeared in the 
Vusix advertisement. The task was designed such that four of the 10 claims actually did 
appear in the Vusix advertisement (hits), three did not appear in any advertisement (false 
alarm), and the remaining three claims appeared in the array but not in the Vusix ad (ad 
claim intrusions). The ad claim intrusions and false alarms were counterbalanced such 
75 
 
that the intrusions in the fashion array condition were the false alarms in the electronics 
array condition, and vice versa. 
Given that thematic processing constitutes the mapping of relational properties, 
people should mistakenly recall generic ad claims from the thematic ads when the 
magazine cued the conventional association (i.e., ad claim intrusions; Noseworthy et al., 
2011). This should be less of a problem in the mismatch condition, and should not 
happen at all in the control condition. If participants explicitly categorize the product in 
the control, they do so taxonomically, hence ad claims intrusions resulting from thematic 
mapping across advertisements would not manifest. This task would not only offer an 
important implication of schematic activation, but also further confirm the type of 
processing.  
 
5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Target Evaluations 
An analysis of target evaluations as a function of contextual array (consumer 
fashion vs. consumer electronics) and magazine label (Wired vs. Vogue vs. no label) 
yielded a significant contextual array × label interaction, F(2, 174) = 6.50, p < .005, η2 = 
.07. As illustrated in table 4, the nature of the interaction was such that the magazine 
label (or lack thereof) altered target evaluations as a function of the contextual array. 
Specifically, planned contrasts revealed that participants who viewed the Vusix within 
the consumer fashion array evaluated it more favourably when the array was featured in 
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Vogue magazine (M = 6.18) than when featured in Wired (M = 5.52), F(1, 174) = 7.16, p 
< .01, or when no label was presented (M = 5.43), F(1, 174) = 8.99, p < .005. Conversely, 
participants who viewed the Vusix within the consumer electronics array evaluated it 
more favourably when the array was featured in Wired magazine (M = 5.91) than when 
featured in Vogue (M = 5.36), F(1, 174) = 4.97, p < .05, and marginally more than when 
no label was presented (M = 5.51), F(1, 174) = 2.53, p = .10. Hence, consistent with 
hypothesis 3.1, the fit between the contextual array and the magazine labels seemed to 
augment target evaluations. 
Table 4: Means, Standard Deviations, Proportions, and Cell Counts for Study 3 
 
 
Consumer Fashion Array 
 
Consumer Electronics Array 
 Wired Vogue Control Wired Vogue Control 
Target Evaluations  5.52 
(0.92) 
6.18 
(0.86) 
5.43 
(0.99) 
5.91 
(0.84) 
5.36 
(0.91) 
5.51 
(1.09) 
Perceived Typicality 3.47 
(0.92) 
3.86 
(0.96) 
3.43 
(0.97) 
3.75 
(0.98) 
3.27 
(0.86) 
3.28 
(0.93) 
Processing .18 
(0.20) 
.26  
(0.18) 
.12  
(0.09) 
.31  
(0.20) 
.21  
(0.15) 
.14 
 (0.13) 
Functional Associations 3.83 
(1.26) 
4.87 
(1.41) 
4.23 
(1.33) 
3.84 
(1.62) 
4.30 
(1.53) 
4.33 
(1.49) 
       
Post-test: LAT        
Categorization * 60% 83% 63% 26% 67% 63% 
Response Latencies ** 2.01 s 1.61 s 2.26 s 1.45 s 2.22 s 2.06 s 
       
Post-test: Cued Recall       
  A′ .58 
(0.16) 
.57  
(0.16) 
.70  
(0.20) 
.61  
(0.18) 
.59  
(0.17) 
.69  
(0.16) 
  FAc .22 
(0.19) 
.25  
(0.18) 
.12  
(0.09) 
.29  
(0.21) 
.24  
(0.18) 
.15  
(0.13) 
  B′′ .07 
(0.25) 
.13  
(0.23) 
.12  
(0.23) 
.13  
(0.22) 
.06  
(0.26) 
.11  
(0.18) 
Cell Size 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Note—Standard deviations are reported in parentheses; * = % of sunglasses (as opposed to 
mp3 player) categorization; ** = listed in seconds. 
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5.2.2 Perceived Typicality  
In step with the target evaluation results, an analysis of perceived typicality as a 
function of contextual array and magazine label yielded a significant contextual array × 
label interaction, F(2, 174) = 3.10, p < .05, η2 = .03. Planned contrasts revealed that 
participants who viewed the Vusix within the consumer fashion array perceived it as 
more typical when the array was featured in Vogue magazine (M = 3.86) than when 
featured in Wired (M = 3.47), F(1, 174) = 3.88, p < .05, or when no magazine label was 
presented (M = 3.43), F(1, 174) = 3.67, p = .057. Conversely, participants who viewed 
the Vusix within the consumer electronics array perceived it as marginally more typical 
when the array was featured in Wired magazine (M = 3.75) than when featured in Vogue 
(M = 3.27), F(1, 174) = 2.41, p = .12, or when no label was presented (M = 3.28), F(1, 
174) = 3.03, p = .08. Hence, consistent with hypothesis 3.2, the fit between the contextual 
array and the magazine labels altered participants’ perceptions of prototypicality. 
Importantly, some of the lowest estimates of perceived typicality were observed in the 
conditions that lacked a contextual cue. 
 
5.2.3 Elaborative Processing 
Using an adjusted ratio of clustering (ARC; Roenker, Thompson, & Brown, 1971), 
a researcher can see whether individuals were more likely to cluster ad claims together or 
recall them in isolation. Clustering has been used to show evidence of relational 
processing—a higher degree of clustering is strong indication of relational mapping (Kim 
& Meyers-Levy, 2008; Noseworthy et al., 2011). An ARC score represents the proportion 
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of actual repetitions above chance to the total possible repetitions. ARC scores for this 
study were calculated such that chance clustering was set to 0 and perfect clustering was 
set to 1. An individual’s ARC score is calculated as follows: 
 
(5) 
 
Where R is the number of pairs of ad claims recalled in successive order, maxR is 
the maximum possible number of ad repetitions, and E(R) is the expected (chance) 
number of ad repetitions. MaxR is calculated by N – k, where N is the total number of 
claims recalled, and k is the number of categories represented in the recall protocol. E(R) 
is calculated as follows: 
(6)
 
 
 
Where ni is the number of claims recalled from category i, and N is as before. 
 
As previously mentioned, the two core ad arrays (consumer fashion array and 
consumer electronics array) consist of disparate product categories that could only be 
linked through conventional association. Hence, the ads did not share specific feature 
information per se. As a result, clustering was assessed by calculating the number of 
times the features (including the brand) from one ad were related to the features in 
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another (e.g., “It’d be nice if the Vusix had the same storage capacity as the BlackBerry 
Curve,” “I don’t think the Vusix brand embodies style like Dior or Gucci”).  
The prediction was that individuals who process the array in the absence of a 
contextual cue (i.e., the no label control condition) will be more prone to view the ads in 
an unrelated manner, and thus be less likely to cluster the claims. This finding would be 
consistent with prior work demonstrating that people are more apt to processes an 
unrelated ad context in an item-specific (as opposed to relational) manner (Malaviya, 
2007; Malaviya et al., 1996; Noseworthy et al., 2011). If, however, the magazine label 
can cue a conventional association, people should be far more likely to bind the claims 
together (relationally), and as such, clustering should increase. Indeed, this prediction is 
rather important given the dominant belief that disparate objects can only lead to item-
specific processing. The results confirm this is not the case. 
 An analysis of participants’ ARC scores as a function of contextual array and 
magazine label yielded a significant contextual array × label interaction, F(2, 174) = 3.96, 
p < .05, η2 = .04. Planned contrasts revealed that participants who viewed the Vusix 
within the consumer fashion array were more likely to cluster the ad claims/concepts 
when the array was featured in Vogue magazine (M = .26) than when featured in Wired 
(M = .18), F(1, 174) = 3.31, p = .07, or when no magazine label was presented (M = .12), 
F(1, 174) = 11.34, p < .005. Conversely, participants who viewed the Vusix within the 
consumer electronics array were more likely to cluster the ad claims/concepts when the 
array was featured in Wired magazine (M = .31) than when featured in Vogue (M = .21), 
F(1, 174) = 4.51, p < .05, or when no label was presented (M = .14), F(1, 174) = 15.20, p 
< .001. Hence, consistent with hypothesis 3.3, the fit between the contextual array and the 
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magazine labels altered how participants processed the target product. This finding, 
coupled with the typicality results, suggests that participants were indeed using the array 
to process the product. If so, the contextual arrays should influence consumers’ functional 
associations.   
 
5.2.4 Functional Associations 
As mentioned previously, participants’ functional associations were gathered by 
having them to trade-off gradients in brightness and visibility for clarity and quality of 
sound. Given that participants were exposed to six different combinations which varied 
the severity of the trade-off, functional association was treated as a continuous variable. 
Hence, a score of 6 (perfect visibility but very poor sound quality) would indicate pure 
sunglasses association, whereas a score of 1 (perfect sound quality but very poor 
visibility) would indicate pure mp3 player association. 
An analysis of participants’ functional associations as a function of contextual array 
and magazine label yielded a significant main effect of label, F(2, 174) = 4.09, p < .05, η2 
= .04. Planned contrasts revealed that participants were more likely to trade off image 
quality for sound quality when the Vusix array was featured in Vogue magazine (M = 
4.35) than when featured in Wired (M = 3.99), F(1, 174) = 8.06, p < .01, but not more so 
than when no magazine label was presented (M = 4.28, p = .26). The contextual array × 
magazine label interaction was not significant (F < 1). Hence, although hypothesis 3.4 
was not supported, it did seem that the labels had some influence on participants’ 
functional inferences. This should not be taken as evidence that thematic arrays have no 
influence on functional expectations. We have to be careful when assuming the null in 
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this case, particularly following a post study debrief that revealed several participants 
attributed the sound degradation to the lab computers and thus based their inferences on 
picture quality alone. Hence, the association task may not have been ideal.  
 
5.2.5 Post-test Latency Association 
To circumvent the problem of raw latencies having a skewed distribution, response 
times were standardized within-subjects. For the sake of interpretation, all means are 
listed in seconds, but analyses were conducted on the standardized data. Before exploring 
participants’ response latencies it was important to analyze their actual responses. As 
previously discussed, the latency association task randomly displayed five different pairs 
of sunglasses, five different mp3 players, and the Vusix target. Participants’ 
categorization of the Vusix served to test whether the contextual array, the magazine 
label, or the interaction between the two, could influence category judgments over time.  
A binary logistic regression on the categorization of the Vusix in the latency 
association task (sunglasses = 0, mp3 player = 1) yielded a main effect of label, Wald Z = 
12.89, p < .005, and a main effect of contextual array, Wald Z = 5.23, p < .05. 
Specifically, though not significant, participants were nevertheless almost twice as likely 
(1/Odds Ratio) to categorize the Vusix as a pair of sunglasses, relative to an mp3 player, 
when they saw the Vusix in the Vogue editorial rather than in the control condition (no 
magazine label), B = -.61, SE = .41, p = .14, OR = .55. Participants were also about twice 
as likely to categorize the Vusix as an mp3 player, relative to a pair of sunglasses, when 
they saw the Vusix in the Wired editorial rather than in the control condition, B = .85, SE 
= .39, p < .05, OR = 2.34. Furthermore, participants were twice as likely to categorize the 
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Vusix as a pair of sunglasses, relative to an mp3 player, when they saw the Vusix in the 
consumer fashion array rather than the consumer electronics array, B = -.78, SE = .33, p < 
.05, OR = .46. The interaction between the magazine label and the contextual array was 
not significant (p = 18). However, as illustrated in table 4, the proportional responses 
actually favour the power of the magazine label to unite the contextual array.  
An analysis of participants’ response latencies as a function of contextual array and 
magazine label yielded a moderately significant contextual array × label interaction, F(2, 
174) = 2.61, p = .07, η2 = .03. Planned contrasts revealed that participants who viewed 
the Vusix within the consumer fashion array were directionally faster at categorizing the 
product when the array was featured in Vogue magazine (M = 1.62 s) than when featured 
in Wired (M = 2.01 s, p = .28), and marginally faster than when no magazine label was 
presented (M = 2.26 s), F(1, 174) = 3.07, p = .08. Conversely, participants who viewed 
the Vusix within the consumer electronics array were faster at categorizing the product 
when the array was featured in Wired magazine (M = 1.45) than when featured in Vogue 
(M = 2.22), F(1, 174) = 4.31, p < .05, and marginally faster than when no label was 
presented (M = 2.06), F(1, 174) = 2.71, p = .10. Although these effects come across as 
rather tenuous, given their marginal nature, they nonetheless support the certainty 
demonstrated in the categorization results.  
 
5.2.6 Post-test Cued Recall 
 Given our limited understanding of the shape and distribution of recognition 
indices, the cued recall data was analyzed using a nonparametric signal detection analysis 
(Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). Following this approach, the stated claims that were 
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correctly identified (hits) and those that were wrongly identified (false alarms), were used 
to calculate a recognition index (A′). Prior to this calculation, all hit and false alarm rates 
were corrected using a log-linear transformation to account for undefined z-scores of 0 
and 1. The resulting recognition index (A′) varied from .5 to 1, with .5 indicating no ad 
claim recognition, and 1 indicating perfect ad claim recognition (for a discussion of the 
equations used in the recognition index, see Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988).  
An analysis of ad claim recognition as a function of contextual array and magazine 
label yielded a significant main effect of label, F(2, 174) = 7.91, p < .005, η2 = .08. 
Planned contrasts revealed that participants were better able to distinguish which ad 
claims belonged to the Vusix when no magazine label was presented (M = .70) than when 
the Vusix array was featured in Vogue magazine (M = .57), F(1, 174) = 12.92, p < .001, 
or Wired magazine (M = .59), F(1, 174) = 10.71, p < .005. There was no difference in 
participants’ ad recognition between the Vogue and Wired conditions (F < 1). This effect 
suggests there is something about the conventional cues (i.e., the magazine labels) that 
led to relatively poor ad claim recognition (relative to the control). An analysis of the 
nature of participants’ false alarms offered some further insight.  
Consistent with prior work (Noseworthy et al., 2011), false alarms can be broken 
down into pure errors (i.e., stating a claim was made in the Vusix ad that did not appear 
in any of the ads) and errors of composition—also known as category intrusions (i.e., 
stating a claim was made in the Vusix ad that was actually made in one of the other ads). 
An analysis focusing solely on the ad claim intrusions (FAc) as a function of contextual 
array and magazine label yielded a significant main effect of label, F(2, 174) = 8.62, p < 
.001, η2 = .07. In step with the recognition index results, planned contrasts revealed that 
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participants were less likely to make errors of composition when no magazine label was 
presented (M = .14) than when the Vusix array was featured in Vogue magazine (M = 
.24), F(1, 174) = 13.88, p < .001, or Wired magazine (M = .25), F(1, 174) = 11.93, p < 
.001. No other significant contrasts were recorded (Fs < 1). Of course, the descriptive 
statistics suggest a comparatively small degree of intrusions relative to prior work (cf. 
Noseworthy et al., 2011). This was not surprising given the products in the arrays were 
not from the same category—only a few features could normatively relate. Nevertheless, 
the fact that intrusions occurred at all across disparate products when a thematic cue 
conventionally link them, fits perfectly with the elaborative processing results and the 
typicality results. People were using the context to make sense of the Vusix.   
To be certain, one final step was administered to rule out the possible alternate 
explanation that people were maybe a bit more confused when the labels were presented 
and thus were biased towards the affirmative (i.e., they merely said they saw any claim). 
Using the same parameters employed to calculate the recognition index, a bias index (B′′) 
was calculated. The index varied between +1 and -1, with a positive number indicating a 
bias towards the affirmative (yea-saying) and a negative number indicating a bias towards 
the negative (nay-saying). The results revealed that participants were no more biased 
when recalling the ad claims when there was no label presented then when they viewed 
the array with a Vogue label or Wired label (MControl = .12 vs. MVogue = .09 vs. MWired = 
.10; Fs < 1). Thus, the ad claim intrusions could not be attributed to a propensity to 
respond in the affirmative. When combining the post-test results (i.e., the category 
intrusion results, latency results and the categorization results), it seems as though 
hypothesis 3.5 was partially supported. That is, category inferences did persist over time, 
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and in the absence of the contextual cue, but they were not perfectly consistent with the 
interactions observed in the first half of the study.   
 
5.3 Discussion 
Up to this point, I have demonstrated that context can alter category activation and 
thus inform functional expectations (study 1), attribute preference (study 2), and now 
perceptions of proto-typicality (study 3). Beyond extending our understanding of how 
hybrid products interact with their surrounding environment, study 3 also served to 
replicate the fit results observed in studies 1 and 2, while using a different hybrid product 
and different context manipulation. Nevertheless, a discussion of the merits of study 3 
would not be complete without an equal acknowledgment of its shortcomings. For what it 
may have made up for in creativity, the functional association task lacked validity. 
Furthermore, despite the upward adjustment of the sample requirement in light of the 
small effect sizes observed in study 1, the sample estimate did not take into account that 
study 1 had a stronger manipulation (i.e., brand + imagery fit). Hence, the sample 
requirement (i.e., the power) should probably have been raised to seek out even smaller 
effects. This would have helped the numerous marginal contrasts.   
With that said, the true value in study 3 comes from illustrating how the common 
practice of analyzing new ambiguous products in the absence of a natural context can 
lead to erroneous results. This is particularly problematic given the finding that 
contextual cues can alter estimates of proto-typicality. Indeed, there is a precision 
required of researchers examining the moderate incongruity effect. It is imperative that 
86 
 
manipulations are indeed moderately incongruent. Given that most incongruity 
manipulations have employed conceptual incongruity (i.e., product ambiguity; Meyers-
Levy & Tybout, 1989; Perrachio & Tybout, 1996), one cannot help but wonder if the 
stimuli would truly be moderately incongruent if observed in a normative context.   
Beyond the implications for the literature on the moderate incongruity effect, the 
results of study 3 also offer an interesting take on the single category belief problem. 
Consumer researchers exploring product ambiguity have shown that perceptual similarity 
can dominate single category beliefs (Gregan-Paxton et al., 2005), and this effect can 
persist over time (Noseworthy & Goode, 2011). This research is the first to show that the 
consumption context can override perceptual similarity, and its influence can equally 
persist. This specific finding fits with recent evidence that consumers can sometimes use 
the surrounding context to make sense of incongruent products (Noseworthy et al., 2011). 
The study 3 results support the primary finding from study 2.  
An interesting finding to emerge from study 3 is that exploiting fit is not without its 
cost. Despite the fact that contextual cues seemed to persist over time, participants were 
more likely to mistakenly recall contextual information for product information. Not only 
is this further confirmation of the extent to which consumers will use the surrounding 
context to make sense of a new ambiguous product, but it affords a cautionary note that 
context can also confuse customers. Beyond questioning the dominance of perceptual 
similarity in artifact recognition and single category beliefs, the observation that category 
beliefs can persist over time, suggests that context can influence category judgments in 
both the near and far term. This has direct and meaningful implications for the literature 
on attitude stability, which brings us to our final study.  
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Chapter 6  
 
6 Study 4: Context Influences Attitude Stability 
 
Although not explicitly acknowledging hybrid products, researchers have begun 
exploring the impact of ambiguous product features on attitude stability over time (Kim 
et al., 2009; Zhao, Hoeffler, & Zauberman, 2007). In one of the more recent examples, 
Kim, Park and Wyer found that when consumers were shown a new radio set with 
positive sound-related features and negative clock-related features and vice versa, they 
considered sound-related features regardless of whether they planned to use the radio 
immediately or in the future, but considered clock-related features more so in the 
immediate context. The authors couched their findings in construal level theory (CLT; 
Trope & Liberman, 2003), arguing that consumers consider high-level desirability-related 
features regardless of when they anticipate using the product, but also consider low-level 
feasibility-related features when anticipating immediate consumption. This logic was 
based on Trope and Liberman’s (2000) distinction between central and peripheral 
features. Despite the notable commonalities between Kim et al. and Trope and Liberman, 
there is a rather subtle conceptual detail separating the two papers.  
Unlike Kim et al. (2009), Trope and Liberman (2000) did not assign central and 
peripheral properties to the product per se, but to the product’s goal. For example, if you 
believe a new product was intended to be a radio, and if there is a choice between a radio 
with good sound functions but poor clock functions, and a radio with good clock 
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functions but poor sound functions, sound quality should be more central than clock 
quality—given the product’s goal. Trope and Liberman (2000) argued, “features that are 
relevant to the product's intended goal are more central than goal-irrelevant features and 
therefore constitute a higher level of construal [italics added]” (p. 882). Temporal 
Construal Theory (TCT) predicts that “the preference for options with a positive high-
level construal over options with a negative high-level construal will be stronger in the 
distant future than in the near future” (Trope & Liberman, 2000, p. 880). Hence, Trope 
and Liberman predicted and indeed found that preference for a radio with good sound-
related functions but poor clock-related functions increases over time, whereas preference 
for a radio with poor sound-related functions but good clock-related functions decreases 
over time. Again, this is presumably contingent on the consumers seeing the product as a 
radio. If consumers believed the product was intended to be a clock, we should see the 
opposite pattern of effects—a manipulation surprisingly absent from both papers. 
If Trope and Liberman (2000) are correct, then merely labeling a clock-radio a 
clock should flip which features are seen as desirable and feasible in the Kim et al. paper 
(2009). After all, Kim et al. achieved remarkable consistency with Trope and Liberman 
by labeling the product a radio set. Yet there is reason to predict that this will not happen.  
There is a fundamental difference between focusing on the present and imagining 
the future, and arguably this difference extends beyond the nature of construal to 
incorporate unique characteristics of the consumption context. Researchers have shown 
that evaluations can flexibly incorporate contextual information in a near scenario, but be 
relatively void of contextual influence in a far scenario (Ledgerwood, Trope, & Chaiken, 
2010). Indeed, this phenomenon is rather robust if one restricts their definition of context 
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to the immediate physical context. Yet this is not the only context consumers operate in. 
There is a broader context seldom explored by marketers, and this context guides a vast 
array of consumption-related behaviours. It is when an attitude towards a product is more 
strongly linked to what it would be like to interact with the product. This type of context 
relies on mental simulation, which is the ability to project one’s self into an imaginary 
future (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; Tulving, 2002). It incorporates one’s 
personal identity, or better yet, one’s ideal self. This is why mental simulation can be 
biased by an individual’s self-concept (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Wilson & 
Ross, 2003).  
Consider the clock-radio example. A clock-radio can be described in multiple ways, 
and these descriptions can be ordered on a continuum from concrete (e.g., purchasing the 
best features for the best price) to abstract (e.g., purchasing the one that goes best with my 
décor; Trope & Liberman, 2010; Vallacher & Wegner, 1985). On one end of the 
continuum, concrete construals define an object in terms of its constituent parts, whereas 
on the other end, abstract construals define an object in relation to its broader context 
(Libby & Eibach, 2011). Hence, it could be that in the near future, consumers are more 
apt to process the product within the immediate context, whereas in the distant future, 
consumers are more apt to process the product within the broader context (i.e., the usage 
experience). This prediction is not without support.  
There is a wealth of literature to suggest that future thinking tends to incorporate 
principle characters, contexts, and actions (Gardiner, Ramponi & Richardson-Klavehn, 
2002). Future simulations also tend to feature more particularities than regularities 
(Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). As such, our ability to travel forward in time, what is 
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commonly referred to as mental time travel, is more about shaping planned behaviour and 
imagination (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Tulving, 
2001). Hence, it seems almost fitting that future simulations tend to be coloured by affect 
(D’Argembeaua & Linden, 2007; 2004). Consider, for example, if you were asked to 
name a luxury sports car. Knowing that a Ferrari fits the normative definition is very 
different than imagining driving one. Indeed, you would likely not imagine being stuck in 
traffic—though an equally probable event. This is one of the reasons why people often 
make “choices that fail to optimize hedonic experience” (Wirtz, Kruger, & Diener, 2003, 
p. 522). Most prospective simulations are biased by current emotions.   
It may be tempting to dismiss the role of emotion when it comes to the clock-radio 
example given that Trope and Liberman (2000) explicitly argued in favour of temporal 
construal theory over valence-dependent time discounting—the idea that temporal 
distance will increase the attractiveness of an object to the extent that it is associated with 
positive or negative features (Lewin, 1951; Miller, 1944). The argument being that the 
clock-positive but sound-negative radio and clock-negative but sound-positive radio both 
“give rise to a conflict between positive and negative features [italic added]” (Trope and 
Liberman, 2000, p. 882). However, this line of reasoning assumes that a radio with good 
sound-related features but poor clock-related features is of equal valence as a radio with 
poor sound-related features but good clock-related features. Not only was this assumption 
not tested, but there is reason to believe it to be invalid, particularly when it comes to an 
ambiguous product where only the sound-related features were consistent with the 
product’s category.  
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If we consider the single category belief problem, the results of Kim et al. (2009) 
and Trope and Liberman (2000) are perfectly consistent with valence-dependent time 
discounting. Both studies were dealing with competing categories where only one 
category was activated, and temporal distance increased the attractiveness of the product 
to the extent that the activated category was associated with positive or negative features. 
This is particularly problematic for Kim et al. given the authors’ position study 1 as a 
replication to motivate their inquiry, but their distinction between desirable and feasible 
features would seemingly support differences in valence—something Trope and 
Liberman did not endorse.  
The reason why it matters whether the results were due to valence-dependent time 
discounting or goal dependent construals is because, in the case of valence-dependent 
time discounting, the product’s intended goal is a sufficient but not a necessary 
requirement to predict preferences over time. That is, just because we can show that a 
radio’s sound quality matters more than its clock quality, does not mean that if we 
manipulated the product’s goal to be a clock, the discrepancy in preference would 
reverse. Why? Because focusing on the impact of sound quality within the broader usage 
experience may evoke a stronger emotional response than focusing on the impact of 
clock quality. Hence, when we imagine interacting with the product, the valence of the 
sound-related features may take precedence because they simply matter more.   
If future simulations are more likely to conjure a product’s usage experience, and if 
future simulations can be biased by affect, attitude stability over time may indeed have 
more to do with how the valence of the features relate to the usage experience than to the 
product’s intended goal. Hence, regardless of whether we manipulate a manufacturer’s 
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intent for a clock-radio to be a radio set or a clock, and more importantly, regardless of 
whether consumers classify a clock-radio as a radio set or a clock, attitudes may remain 
predictably unstable in the same direction. That is, irrespective of goal or classification 
judgment, preference for good sound-related features but poor clock-related features may 
increase over time, whereas preference for poor sound-related features but good clock-
related features may decrease over time.  
The challenge with the above prediction (H4.1) rests not in testing attitude 
consistency, but in testing whether the effect is truly the result of representing the usage 
experience in the distant future as opposed to the product category in the near future. To 
do this, we must first understand what it would mean to represent the usage experience as 
opposed to the object. In particular, we should see clear differences between near future 
and distant future simulations in terms of how people mentally represent the product 
(H4.2), themselves (H4.3), and the act of consumption (H4.4), and these representations 
should correspond with predictable changes in memory (H4.5). Should these effects 
manifest as expected, they would not only pose a considerable challenge for the notion of 
goal dependent construals, but more importantly, they would suggest that researchers 
contrasting temporally near simulations against temporally far simulations may be 
tapping two distinct aspects of consumption. The following paragraphs handle each of the 
subsequent hypotheses in detail (H4.2 to H4.5). Exhibit 4 presents the core hypotheses 
that underlie the proposition that context influences attitude stability (P4).     
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Exhibit 4: Proposition #4 – Context Influences Attitude Stability 
 
6.1 Category Representation (H4.2) 
The literature on single category beliefs is predicated on taxonomic processing—
identifying what a product is and stating its core functionality. Researchers have yet to 
examine how single category beliefs operate over time. Researchers have shown that 
taxonomic processing benefits from a concrete construal, whereas thematic processing 
benefits from an abstract construal (Noseworthy et al., 2010). This is not surprising given 
that thematic processing allows individuals to make sense of the past and predict the 
 
SUMMARY OF STUDY 4 HYPOTHESES 
 
4.1* Target Evaluations. A product’s intended goal will predict consumers’ target 
evaluations in the near future but not in the distant future. 
 
4.2 Category Representations. Consumers will be more likely to think about a common 
usage experience when simulating distant future consumption than when simulating 
near future consumption, whereas they will be more likely to think about the 
product’s features when simulating near future consumption than distant future 
consumption.  
 
4.3  Mental Representations. Consumers will be more likely to imagine consuming in the 
third person (relative to the first person) when simulating distant future consumption 
than when simulating near future consumption. 
 
4.4 Consumption Representations. Consumers will be more concerned with regrets of 
inaction (relative to regrets of action) when simulating distant future consumption than 
when simulating near future consumption. 
 
4.5 Simulation Recall. Consumers will recall more affective reactions to features, 
psychological states, first-person accounts, fine details, and associated thoughts after 
simulating near future consumption, whereas they will recall more affective reactions 
to the experience, spatial relations, third-person accounts, peripheral details, and 
aspects on their physical appearance after simulating distant future consumption. 
 
* Core Hypothesis for which H4.2 to H4.5 attempt to explain (i.e., highlight the mechanism)  
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future (Lin & Murphy, 2001; Markman, 1984). Hence, in the near future, people may be 
more prone to represent a product taxonomically (what the product is and what it does), 
whereas in the distant future, people may be more prone to represent a product 
thematically (how the product is used and what it is used with). This would be consistent 
with recent findings that abstract construals can increase the number of complementary, 
between-category purchases (Goldsmith, Xu, & Dhar, 2010). If so, this finding would 
begin to support the idea that individuals who imagine the distant future tend to process 
the usage experience as opposed to the product category. Furthermore, if participants do 
indeed generate more thoughts about the usage experience in the distant future, and if the 
nature of the thoughts does not vary with the product’s intended goal, then one would be 
hard pressed to argue in favour of goal dependent activation.  
 
6.2 Mental Representation (H4.3) 
Of course, mental simulation plays a crucial role in our ability to plan and prepare 
for our future (Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Schacter et al., 2007; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 
1997). However, it also plays a role in how we literally see ourselves. There is recent 
evidence linking mental simulation and particularly imagery perspective (whether we see 
ourselves in third person or in first person) to an individual’s level of construal (Libby, 
Shaeffer, & Eibach, 2009; Vasquez & Buehler, 2007).  
Libby and Eibach (2011) argued that a first-person perspective involves a bottom-
up style of thinking in which people incorporate concrete features and define events in 
terms of constituent aspects, while a third-person perspective involves a top-down style 
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of thinking in which people integrate the broader context and define events in terms of its 
abstract meaning (p. 188). Researchers have confirmed that people who imagine in the 
third person tend to process information more abstractly, whereas people who imagine in 
the first person tend to process information more concretely (Shaeffer, Libby, & Eibach, 
2011). What is fascinating about this effect is that it is bidirectional—people who think 
abstractly favour a third-person perspective, whereas people who think concretely favour 
a first-person perspective (Libby et al., 2009).  
Given that near future events correspond with concrete thinking, whereas distant 
future events correspond with abstract thinking (Liberman & Trope, 1998), it could be 
that when people imagine temporally distant consumption they tend to do so in the third 
person, as an actor consuming the usage experience. In temporally near consumption, 
such mental simulation is of little value because it is the product, as opposed to the usage 
experience, that is being consumed. Hence, when people imagine temporally near 
consumption they should do so more in the first person. This prediction would fit with 
hypothesis 4.2 given that thematic processing contextually links disparate products 
through conventional association (the usage experience) and a third-person perspective 
may make the association more salient.  
 
6.3 Consumption Representation (H4.4) 
Rosenweig and Gilovich (2011) recently noted an important distinction in the 
nature of regret for material and experiential purchases. Material purchases tend to 
generate regrets of actions (buyer’s remorse), whereas experiential purchases tend to 
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generate regrets of inaction (missed opportunities). This phenomenon shares an important 
relationship with hypothesis 4.3 given there is evidence linking regret to imagery 
perspective. Specifically, picturing a regrettable incident from the third-person 
perspective rather than first-person perspective can decrease regrets of action but increase 
regrets of inaction (Valenti, Libby, & Eibach, 2011). Of course, our clock-radio is a 
material purchase. Hence, we should see buyer’s remorse factor more strongly than 
missed opportunities, particularly given that the product explicitly conveys some inferior 
features. However, if people are processing temporally distant consumption as a usage 
experience, they should be more concerned with missed opportunities than with buyer’s 
remorse. Alternately, in the near future, people should process the clock-radio as a 
material purchase and thus be more concerned with buyer’s remorse than missed 
opportunities. Again, should this finding manifest it would suggest that the temporal 
frame was cuing much more than just a change in construal. If so, we should see 
predictable differences in how participants represent near and distant simulations.  
 
6.4 Simulation Recall (H4.5) 
Researchers have shown that along with differences in evaluations caused by the 
temporal frame, people tend to show predictable differences in memory. Specifically, 
Kim et al. (2009) observed that people were more apt to recall sound-related features (as 
opposed to clock-related features) when imagining the distant future, whereas in the near 
future, people recalled both the sound-related and clock-related features about equally. 
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The authors interpreted this as evidence that individuals considered feasibility (clock-
related) features in the near future more so than in the distant future.  
Although plausible, it is important to note that in the Kim et al. studies there was 
always a desirability-related feature tagged to the feasibility-related feature. That is, the 
clock-positive product was always sound negative, and the sound positive product was 
always clock negative. Hence, another interpretation that is consistent with Trope and 
Liberman (2000) is simply that high-level (sound-related) features carry more weight 
over time. Although the two interpretations may sound equivalent, the latter suggest that 
in the absence of a high-level feature the difference in recall for the low-level features 
may disappear. In other words, the high-level features were driving the effect. The reason 
this is important is because it brings up the question about what it means for something to 
carry more weight over time.  
Like many of the other hypotheses, hypothesis 4.5 shares an important relationship 
with hypothesis 4.3. Researchers have linked changes in memory with imagery 
perspective. Specifically, when people imagine themselves in the first-person, they tend 
to recall more information about their bodily sensations, affective reactions, and 
psychological states, whereas when people imagine themselves in the third-person they 
tend to remark on peripheral details, while focusing on key actions, spatial relations, and 
their physical appearance as actors within a scene (Fiske, Taylor, Etcoff, & Laufer, 1979; 
McIsaac & Eich, 2002). If the relationship between construal level theory and imagery 
perspective is as strong as evidence would suggest, then we should see corresponding 
differences emerge as a function of the temporal frame. If so, this would be strong 
evidence that there may be more to how consumers represent objects in memory than 
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mere route recall. That is, there may be qualitatively distinct concepts that emerge over 
time that drive one target feature (sound related feature) to be more salient than the other 
(clock related features).  
Bringing all of this together, I predict that in the distant future, consumers will be 
more likely to process the usage experience than the product itself. Specifically, when 
consumers imagine the distant future, they will envision themselves as actors engaging in 
consumption [third person], they will conjure a scenario where the consumption took 
place [experiential consumption], they will concern themselves with regrets of inaction 
[missed opportunities], and their recollections will focus primarily on the events 
surroundings the product’s usage experience. Conversely, when consumers simulate the 
near future, they will envision the product as if through their own eyes [first person], they 
will focus on the product’s transient utility [material consumption], they will concern 
themselves with regrets of action [buyer’s remorse], and their recollections will focus 
primarily on the product’s physical characteristics. Should the results manifest as 
expected, they would lend some much needed insights into the nature of anticipatory 
consumption.  
 
6.5 Method 
6.5.1 Participants & Design 
Undergraduate students (N = 240; 51% female; Mage = 21.1) participated in the 
study in exchange for course credit. The sample was calculated based on standard 
estimates for the social sciences (1 – β = .80;  f = .25;  α = .05; Cohen, 1998), and then 
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rounded up to account for the somewhat small effect sizes observed in prior work (e.g., 
Trope & Liberman, 2000; Kim et al., 2009; Zhao et al., 2011). The sample requirement 
worked out to exactly 30 participants per cell. The manipulation and dependent measures 
were administered electronically in a behavioural lab. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of eight experimental conditions in a 2 (target: sound-positive vs. clock-
positive) × 2 (temporal distance: near future vs. distant future) × 2 (category cue: clock 
vs. radio) between-subjects factorial design. The study followed the exact same 
procedures outlined in Kim et al. (2009; study 1) while using Trope and Liberman’s 
(2000; study 3) manipulation for the target.  
 
6.5.2 Stimuli Construction 
The scenarios used in this study were taken directly from Trope and Liberman 
(2000; study 3). The only difference being that two additional scenarios were created to 
shift the product’s intended goal towards being a clock rather than a radio set (see 
scenarios 3 and 4 below). The four scenarios shown below, including their temporal 
frame (i.e., tomorrow vs. one year from now) made up the eight experimental conditions. 
 
1. Radio, Sound-Positive: “Imagine that tomorrow [one year from now] you will 
buy this new radio set (shown below). You need a simple set in the kitchen to 
listen to morning programs and music when you get up. When you arrive 
home, you discover that it fits just great in the place you wanted to put it, and 
the sound is really good. However, the clock that is built into the set turns out 
to be pretty useless. The digits are too small and can be hardly seen unless you 
stand right in front of it.” 
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2. Radio, Clock-Positive: “Imagine that tomorrow [one year from now] you will 
buy this new radio set (shown below). You need a simple set in the kitchen to 
listen to morning programs and music when you get up. When you arrive 
home, you discover that if you put the radio in the place you wanted, the 
reception is bad, and to get reasonable reception you have to put it in a rather 
inconvenient place. However, the clock that is built into the set turns out to be 
pretty useful. It has large clear digits that can be easily seen from anywhere in 
the kitchen.” 
 
3. Clock, Sound-Positive: “Imagine that tomorrow [one year from now] you will 
buy this new clock (shown below). You need a simple clock in the kitchen to 
keep you on track in the morning. When you arrive home, you discover that it 
fits just great in the place you wanted to put it, and the radio that is built into it 
sounds really good. However, the clock turns out to be pretty useless. The 
digits are too small and can be hardly seen unless you stand right in front of it.” 
 
4. Clock, Clock-Positive: “Imagine that tomorrow [one year from now] you will 
buy this new clock (shown below). You need a simple clock in the kitchen to 
keep you on track in the morning. When you arrive home, you discover that if 
you put the clock in the place you wanted, the built in radio gets bad reception, 
and to get reasonable reception you have to put it in a rather inconvenient 
place. However, the clock turns out to be pretty useful. It has large clear digits 
that can be easily seen from anywhere in the kitchen” 
 
To ensure that individuals were not ignoring the product’s goal, each scenario 
accompanied a visual depiction. Given that category activation tends to occur rather 
quickly at the basic level, and given that basic-level processing is highly visual (Rosch et 
al., 1976), combining a visual depiction with the label was believed to assist in 
reinforcing the product’s goal. The selection of an appropriate visual depiction was 
accomplished through a pretest (n = 46). Participants were shown photographs of 12 
different clock-radios, and were asked to classify each photograph as either depicting a 
clock, a radio, or uncertain. The stimuli with the greatest frequency of being categorized 
as a clock (radio) while having the lowest frequency of being categorized as a radio 
(clock) are shown in figure 1. The photographs (whichever matched the label) were 
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displayed beneath the four scenarios listed above—hence, the “shown below” statement 
in parentheses in each scenario.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Clock: 92%                     Radio: 90% 
 
 
 
6.5.3 Procedures & Dependent Measures 
Prior to reading the script and seeing the corresponding photographs, participants 
were instructed that they were about to read a common scenario and were explicitly asked 
to imagine what it would be like to be in the specified scenario. Participants then read the 
scenario and viewed the product. Consistent with prior work, participants were asked to 
evaluate the product for use either the next day (near-future) or one-year from now 
(distant-future). The ratings were indicated on scale ranging from 1 (unsatisfactory) to 7 
(satisfactory; Kim et al., 2009; Trope & Liberman, 2000). Participants were then 
informed that consumers often imagine interacting with a product in a variety of ways, 
and were asked to indicate whether they imagined interacting with the product discussed 
in the scenario in the first-person (“as if looking out of your own eyes at your hands 
holding the product”) or whether they imagined interacting with the product in the third-
Figure 1: Clock and Radio stimuli used with the product labels 
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person (“as if watching yourself holding the product”; Libby et al., 2009). Participants 
then read the following:  
 
“Presumably, most of your purchases have worked out well for you. 
Occasionally, however, we make decisions that we end up regretting. And 
when we do, there are two kinds of regrets we can have. We can regret: (1) 
things we did that we wish we hadn’t done, and (2) things we didn’t do 
that we wish we had. When you think back to the scenario you just read, 
and whether or not you would purchase the product, what would you say 
would possibly be your biggest regret?”—Rosenweig & Gilovich, 2011 
 
Both the imagery perspective (first-person vs. third-person) and the nature of regret 
(action vs. inaction) were presented as binary choices. After completing the evaluation 
measures, participants engaged in a though listing task. A two minute time-limit was 
imposed on the task to capture only the most accessible thoughts (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1981). Upon completing the thought task, participants were administered a mental 
recollection task, which simply asked that they revisit their previously imagined scenario 
and write down exactly what they imagined (what they saw, what they felt, etc.). The 
entire task took approximately 20 minutes to complete. 
 
6.6 Results 
6.6.1 Target Evaluations 
An analysis of target evaluations as a function of target (sound positive vs. clock 
positive), category cue (radio vs. clock), and temporal distance (near future vs. distant 
future) yielded a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 232) = 3.98, p < .05, η2 = .02. The 
nature of the three-way interaction was such that in the near future there was a significant 
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category cue × target interaction, F(1, 232) = 3.29, p < .05. As illustrated in table 5, when 
the product’s goal was to be a clock, participants evaluated the clock-positive target more 
favourably (M = 3.63) than the sound-positive target (M = 3.13). When the product’s goal 
was to be a radio set, participants evaluated the sound-positive target more favourably (M 
= 3.93) than the clock-positive target (M = 3.62). Each of these contrasts was not 
significant, which is consistent with near future conditions in prior work. Nevertheless, 
the pattern would seem to support the influence of the product’s intended goal. This all 
changed when participants imagined the distant future. In the distant future, the 
interaction between category cue and target was not significant (F < 1). The only 
significant result was a main effect of target. Specifically, participants evaluated the 
sound-positive target (M = 3.87) more favourably than the clock-positive target (M = 
3.10), F(1, 232) = 11.65, p < .001. Hence, consistent with hypothesis 4.1, the product’s 
goal influenced participants’ evaluations in the near future but not in the distant future.  
The three-way interaction results pose a serious challenge for the claim of goal 
dependent construals (Trope and Liberman, 2000). Unlike Kim et al. (2009; study 1) and 
Trope and Liberman (2000; study 3), only half of the participants were told the product 
was a radio set. The remaining half was told the product was a clock. Nevertheless, when 
estimating preference in the distant future, individuals preferred the sound-positive 
product over the clock-positive product, regardless of the product’s intended goal. If the 
results are not due to goal dependent construals then maybe there is something to the 
argument made by Kim et al. (2009) that some features are more desirable whereas other 
features are more feasible. However, the data does not support this interpretation either. 
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     Table 5: Means, Standard Deviations, Proportions, and Cell Counts for Study 4 
   
 Near Future Distant Future 
 Clock Radio Set Clock Radio Set 
 Sound- 
Positive 
Clock-
Positive 
Sound-
Positive 
Clock-
Positive 
Sound-
Positive 
Clock-
Positive 
Sound-
Positive 
Clock-
Positive 
Evaluations  3.13 (1.22) 3.63 (1.19) 3.93 (1.12) 3.62 (1.21) 3.83 (1.18) 2.86 (1.11) 3.90 (1.20) 3.33 (1.15) 
         
Category Reps. .20 (0.73) .27 (0.72) -.09 (0.72) -.14 (0.78) .06 (0.76) .27 (0.60) -.02 (0.74) -.16 (0.76) 
  Experiential 28% 13% 12% 23% 47% 58% 40% 42% 
  Material 47% 50% 54% 43% 37% 30% 33% 27% 
Mental Reps. * 20% 33% 30% 43% 47% 57% 47% 60% 
Consump. Reps. **  23% 7% 17% 10% 43% 30% 50% 23% 
         
Simulation Recall         
Affect: features 3.80 (1.95) 4.72 (2.29) 4.30 (1.76) 5.07 (2.58) 2.26 (1.87) 2.13 (1.65) 3.30 (2.38) 1.63 (1.27) 
Affect: experience .93 (1.01) 1.07 (0.84) .99 (1.03) 1.30 (1.07) 2.23 (1.68) 1.97 (1.60) 2.33 (1.56) 2.13 (1.75) 
Psychological  State 4.83 (2.27) 3.69 (2.12) 3.36 (2.23) 3.80 (1.97) 3.10 (1.68) 2.70 (1.44) 2.76 (1.54) 2.96 (1.60) 
Associative Thought 2.03 (1.29) 1.34 (1.39) 1.43 (1.59) 1.30 (1.41) 1.27 (1.38) 1.60 (1.35) 1.23 (1.22) 1.37 (1.52) 
Spatial 0.90 (1.32) 2.34 (2.14) 1.70 (2.07) 2.29 (2.08) 3.28 (2.96) 2.57 (2.95) 3.10 (2.33) 3.53 (2.35) 
Appearance .80 (0.81) .79 (0.90) .70 (0.84) .81 (0.85) .93 (1.11) 1.23 (1.13) .87 (1.16) 1.43 (0.94) 
First Person 4.60 (2.45) 5.10 (3.00) 5.00 (2.54) 4.77 (3.23) 4.13 (1.94) 3.27 (2.21) 3.37 (2.23) 3.90 (2.32) 
Third Person 1.30 (1.31) 1.48 (1.54) 2.56 (3.72) 1.26 (1.34) 1.27 (1.33) 1.10 (1.18) 1.22 (1.48) 1.32 (1.11) 
Fine Details 2.20 (1.47) 1.51 (1.54) 2.57 (2.12) 1.17 (1.34) 1.25 (1.38) 1.13 (1.11) 1.27 (1.40) 1.90 (1.42) 
Periph. Details 1.33 (1.18) 1.55 (1.37) 1.29 (1.25) 1.50 (1.22) 1.63 (1.42) 2.37 (2.34) 1.93 (1.74) 2.57 (2.51) 
         
Cell Size 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Note—Standard deviations are reported in parentheses; * = % of third-person imagery; ** = % of regrets of inaction (missed 
opportunities). 
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Along with the three-way interaction, the results yielded a significant target × 
temporal distance interaction, F(1, 232) = 7.44, p < .01, η2 = .03. Simple effects revealed 
that participants who considered the product for future use evaluated the sound-positive 
target more favourably (M = 3.87) than the clock-positive target (M = 3.11), F(1, 232) = 
11.65, p < .001. Participants who considered the product for immediate use, however, did 
not differ in target evaluations (MSound_Pos = 3.53 vs. MClock_Pos = 3.63). Of course, this 
interaction is embedded in the previously discussed three-way interaction, but the reason 
it is worth mentioning is because it is perfectly consistent and even reported in the 
identical fashion as Kim et al. (2009). However, Kim et al. interpreted the interaction as 
indication that participants considered high-level (sound-related) features regardless of 
whether they planned to use the radio set immediately or in the future, but considered 
low-level (clock-related) features to a greater extent in the former condition than the 
latter (p. 637).  
Not only would the above interpretation require a different statistical contrast, but it 
is conceptually problematic because the clock-positive product always had poor sound-
related features. This is what made it, by definition, clock positive. It is in this respect 
that the target labels are a somewhat misleading. Hence, observing that preferences 
dropped over time for a clock-positive product really gives no indication that people were 
considering the clock-related features at all. In fact, assuming participants were not 
considering the clock-related features would be consistent with construal level theory. 
Trope and Liberman (2000) predicted that preference for a negative high-level feature 
will decrease over time (poor sound quality), whereas preference for a positive high-level 
feature will increase over time (good sound quality). Kim et al. acknowledged that the 
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sound-related features were indeed the high-level features. Hence, it could have been the 
negative sound-related features driving the effect. Given there was no control condition 
to decouple the valence of features, it is difficult to accept an interpretation that goes 
against the theory being used to predict it.  
The question then is: if not the product’s intended goal, and if not the 
characteristics of the features themselves, then what caused the observed discrepancy in 
evaluations?  
 
6.6.2 Category Representations 
Two unaffiliated coders classified participants’ thoughts for whether they 
mentioned the clock category, radio category, or remained undefined. In addition, each 
coder was instructed to record whether participants explicitly identified a specific usage 
experience (e.g., “getting to school on time”), and whether they explicitly mentioned the 
product features—good or bad (e.g., “I doubt this clock would work that well because of 
the small digits”). The two coders’ results were consistent (intercoder reliability = .78). 
All outstanding disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
A thought index was constructed by taking the difference between the number of 
clock-related thoughts and radio-related thoughts, divided by the total number of 
thoughts. Zero indicates an equal number of clock and radio-related thoughts, a positive 
number indicates more clock-related thoughts, and a negative number indicates more 
radio-related thoughts. A full factorial ANOVA revealed only one significant effect. 
Participants were more likely to list clock-related thoughts when the target was labeled as 
a clock (M = .20) and were more likely to list radio-related thoughts when the target was 
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labeled a radio set (M = -.10), F(1, 232) = 10.02, p < .005, η2 = .04. No other effects 
approached significance (Fs < 1.5). Hence, this effect did not vary by temporal distance. 
The results confirm that the category cues altered the product’s intended goal as 
expected. This should not be surprising given what we know about the strength of the 
product’s visual appearance and label in defining consumer inferences (Gregan-Paxton et 
al., 2005; Moreau et al., 2001b; Noseworthy & Goode, 2011). Nevertheless, this occurred 
despite distant future evaluations remaining consistent across the two categories. 
As mentioned, beyond the category itself (whether a clock or a radio), the coders 
also classified the characteristics of participants’ thoughts. This is where the usage 
experience becomes important. Consistent with hypothesis 4.2, of the 120 participants in 
the distant future condition, 38 (32%) explicitly remarked on the product’s functionality 
(good or bad), whereas of the 120 participants in the near future condition, 58 (48%) 
explicitly remarked on the product’s functionality, χ2(1) = 6.94, p < .05, ϕ = .17. Contrast 
this with the observation that 55 of the 120 participants (42%) in the distant future 
condition explicitly identified a usage experience, a result vastly different than the 23 out 
of 120 participants (19%) who identified a usage experience in the near future condition, 
χ
2(1) = 14.35, p < .001, ϕ = .25. These results confirm that participants were more likely 
to focus on the product in the near future than in the distant future, but were more likely 
to focus on the product’s usage experience in the distant future than in the near future.   
A follow-up content analysis of participants’ experiential thoughts revealed no 
material difference across category cues in the distant future condition. The majority of 
participants described some variant of listening to music in the kitchen in the morning. 
Hence, despite individuals thinking about the product as clock or a radio, they did not 
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differ in how they imagined interacting with the product. This would support the idea that 
people are more likely to process the usage experience in the distant future than in the 
near future. If so, we should see differences in others factors that relate directly to how 
people represent the usage experience.  
 
6.6.3 Mental Representations 
A binary logistic regression was conducted with imagery perspective (0 = first 
person; 1 = third person) as the dependent variable and temporal distance (near future vs. 
distant future), target (sound positive vs. clock positive), and category cue (clock vs. 
radio set) as the predictor variables. Overall, there was a significant effect of temporal 
distance on imagery perspective. Consistent with the bidirectional relationship linking 
abstract (concrete) construals to third-person (first-person) imagery (Libby et al., 2009), 
and consistent with hypothesis 4.3, participants were more than twice as likely to imagine 
the product in the third-person perspective, relative to the first-person perspective, when 
they considered the distant future rather than the immediate future, B = .89, SE = .27, p < 
.005, OR = 2.43.  
Beyond the effect of temporal distance, there was also a significant effect of target 
(sound-positive vs. clock-positive). Participants were more likely to imagine the product 
in the third-person perspective when they imagined purchasing the clock-positive product 
rather than the sound-positive product, B = .54, SE = .27, p < .05, OR = 1.72. Although 
not predicted, this finding is rather informative because it relates directly to the 
interpretation made by Kim et al. (2009). It may be tempting to interpret this result as 
109 
 
participants responding to the clock-positive features, however, there is reason to believe 
this result has nothing to do with clock quality, and everything to do with sound quality.  
Researchers have linked imagery perspective with affect and emotion. Third-person 
imagery can be used to blunt an emotional event, assisting an individual to process the 
event in a detached manner (Kenny et al., 2009; McIssac & Eich, 2004; Williams & 
Moulds, 2007). Third-person imagery can also be used for self-enhancement when people 
want to disavow responsibility for an undesirable action (Sanitioso, 2008). Presumably, 
in each of these cases the third-person perspective served as a coping mechanism. Hence, 
it is not that third-person imagery uniformly dampens emotion. This observation led 
Libby and Eibach (2011) to propose a contingency framework, whereby third-person 
imagery will reduce affective response in situations where the broader context of one’s 
life reduces the emotional power of the event, but enhance affective response in situations 
where the broader context of one’s life enhances the emotional power of the event. 
Hence, it could be that individuals were more apt to imagine the sound-negative (vis. 
clock-positive) product in the third person as a means of detaching themselves from the 
usage experience. Not only would this support valence-dependent time discounting, but it 
would also support hypothesis 4.1. Sound quality had a greater emotional impact on the 
usage experience than clock quality.  
 
6.6.4 Consumption Representations 
 
A binary logistic regression was conducted with the nature of regret (0 = regret of 
action; 1 = regret of inaction) as the dependent variable and temporal distance, target, 
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and category cue as the predictor variables. In step with the mental representation results, 
there was a significant effect of temporal distance on the nature of regret. Consistent with 
evidence that the nature of regret is different for material and experiential purchases 
(Rosenweig & Gilovich, 2011), and consistent with hypothesis 4.4, participants were 
almost three times more likely to anticipate regrets of inaction (missed opportunities), 
relative to regrets of action (buyer’s remorse), when they considered the distant future 
rather than the immediate future, B = 1.05, SE = .33, p < .005, OR = 2.87. More 
specifically, 17 of the 120 participants (14%) in the near future condition indicated that 
their biggest regret was one of inaction, a result quite different than the 38 out of 120 
participants (32%) in the distant future condition whose biggest regret was one of 
inaction, χ2(1) = 10.41, p < .005, ϕ = .21. 
Consistent with the mental representation results, there was more than just temporal 
distance influencing participants’ consumption representations. Again, there seemed to be 
something about the target. Participants were about twice as likely to anticipate regrets of 
inaction, relative to regrets of action, when they imagined purchasing the sound-positive 
product rather than the clock-positive product, B = .65, SE = .32, p < .05, OR = 1.92. 
Although not hypothesized, this finding reinforces the idea that the targets were not 
identical (i.e., poor clock quality ≠ poor sound quality). This occurred despite the 
category representation results confirming the cues activated the target’s intended goal. 
Indeed, if sound quality causes greater affective reaction when conjuring the usage 
experience, this finding makes intuitive sense. However, up to this point, the role of 
affect can only been inferred from the results. To confirm whether affect played a role in 
the target evaluation, we would need to observe it in participants’ mental simulations. 
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6.6.5 Simulation Recall 
Participants’ recollection protocols were coded into ten categories by two 
unaffiliated coders, both blind to study conditions and hypotheses (intercoder reliability = 
.88). Following a coding scheme modified from McIsaac and Eich (2002), the ten 
categories were defined in terms of statements (single words or phrases) reflecting 
affective reactions, whether emotional or motivational towards (1) the product’s features 
or towards (2) the product’s usage experience (e.g., it’s fun to listen to music in the 
morning; I’m determined buy a clock with bigger digits); (3) psychological states (e.g., I 
wondered if I made the best purchase; I was confused about where to put it); (4) 
associated thoughts, including knowledge or experiences outside of the task (e.g., I 
usually have a coffee when I wake up in the morning; I need to buy new earphones for 
my iPod); (5) personal appearance (e.g., I can see myself in my pajamas; I can see me 
fixing my hair in the morning); (6) spatial relations (e.g., the clock was beside my coffee 
maker; the radio was just to the left of my bed); (7) first-person accounts (e.g., I, me, 
myself); (8) third-person accounts (e.g., he, she, they); (9) fine details of the target, 
including colour, shape, size, and numerical quantifiers (e.g., the clock was small; the 
radio had a round shape); and (10) peripheral details that were not central to the target 
(e.g., the sun was shining into my bedroom).  
The ten categories were modified from McIsaac and Eich’s (2002) original 11 
categories, splitting out affective reactions into whether they were towards the features or 
the experience, and excluding only physical sensations and physical actions because 
participants did not physically interact with the target like they did in the McIsaac and 
Eich study.  
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The total number of recollections in each category was calculated for each 
participant, and the resulting data were then averaged over participants. An analysis of 
participants’ recollection protocols (the ten categories) as a function of target (sound 
positive vs. clock positive), category cue (radio vs. clock), and temporal distance (near 
future vs. distant future) yielded a significant multivariate main effect of temporal 
distance, F(10, 222) = 16.82, p < .005. Supplementary t tests were carried out using a 
Bonferroni-adjusted alpha of .005 (i.e., .05/10).  
The results revealed that near future recollections contained more statements 
reflecting affective reactions towards the product’s features (M = 4.45 vs. M = 1.91), 
t(238) = 7.99, p < .001, d = 1.03; psychological states (M = 3.92 vs. M = 2.88), t(238) = 
4.24, p < .001, d = .55; and first-person accounts (M = 4.88 vs. M = 3.67), t(238) = 3.76, 
p < .001, d = .48. In contrast, distant future recollections contained more statements 
reflecting affective reactions towards the usage experience (M = 1.07 vs. M = 2.17), 
t(238) = -5.93, p < .001, d = .76; spatial relations (M = 1.79 vs. M = 3.12), t(238) = -3.85, 
p < .001, d = .49; peripheral details (M = 1.41 vs. M = 2.11), t(238) = -3.26, p < .005, d = 
.42, and a marginal effect on personal appearance (M = .78 vs. M = 1.11), t(238) = -2.63, 
p = .009, d = .33. The only dimensions along which near and distant recollections did not 
differ were third person accounts (not to be mistaken for third-person perspective; M = 
1.22 vs. M = 1.62, p = .20), fine details (M = 1.85 vs. M = 1.38, p = .14), and associated 
thoughts (M = 1.54 vs. M = 1.37, p = .33). Hence, hypothesis 4.5 was partially supported. 
Nevertheless, the differences in participants’ affective intentions were undeniable.    
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6.7 Discussion 
Consider if you were about to move into a new apartment. Which would matter 
more to the broader context of your life: what it would take to physically move into the 
apartment (expenses, logistics, etc.) or what the apartment itself offers (e.g., space, 
utilities, etc.)? This example is taken directly from Kim et al. (2009; study 2). Despite a 
discussion about high-level and low-level features, the answer requires neither an 
understanding of construal level theory, nor an argument for valence-dependent time 
discounting. Not to denigrate the authors, but how can prospective judgments incorporate 
something that does not exist in prospect? In other words, if we imagine what it would be 
like to live in an apartment we have already consumed the act of moving in. It is a trade-
off between a moment of transient utility to achieve a desired goal and fantasizing about 
the goal itself.  
 The results of this study offer some of the first empirical support for Libby and 
Eibach’s (2011) contingency framework. Libby and Eibach made a poignant observation 
that “subjective feelings of distance may not always be determined by distance from 
sensory experience, even if the tendency to construe abstractly is” (p. 227). Hence, we 
have to be careful not to infer that an incident of abstract thinking is the result of some 
objective measure of distance. The irony should not escape us. Construal level theory is 
often paralleled with seeing the forest for the tree, yet many advocates of the theory 
suffer the analogy. As we know, a theory is not very useful if it explains everything. 
Beyond linking imagery perspective with the level of construal, Libby and Eibach 
(2011) also (re)introduced the roles of emotion, the self, and the broader context of one’s 
life. If we look at Table 5 there is one contrast left to discuss. Libby and Eibach argued 
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that when something negative influences the broader context of one’s life, individuals can 
use third person imagery to mute the emotional impact of the event. If individuals were 
only considering sound quality, the simulation recall results make absolute sense. 
Individuals who simulated the distant future demonstrated a greater degree of affective 
responses towards the usage experience in the sound-positive condition rather than in the 
sound-negative condition. Even in this study’s most base interpretation, arguments 
against valence-dependent time discounting do not hold.  
With that said, one may argue that despite the content analysis of experience 
thoughts, the proposition that sound quality has a greater emotional impact on the usage 
experience than clock quality suffers the exact same problem that Kim et al. (2009) 
suffered. It is difficult to make an inference about the nature of the features when the 
manipulation compounds both valence and category. What is less opaque, however, is 
what the observed results imply about current interpretations for goal dependent 
construals. Not only did the product’s intended goal not influence evaluations over time, 
but participants’ mental representation of the temporally near and temporally distant 
scenarios corresponded to predictable changes in how people represent the product versus 
the product’s usage experience.  
When simulating the distant future, participants envisioned themselves as actors 
engaging in consumption [third person], they conjured a scenario where the consumption 
took place [experiential consumption], they concerned themselves with regrets of 
inaction [missed opportunities], and they subsequently recalled more affective and 
characteristic reactions towards the experience. Conversely, when simulating the near 
future, participant envisioned the product through their own eyes [first person], they 
115 
 
conjured more thoughts about the product’s features [material consumption], they 
concerned themselves with regrets of action [buyer’s remorse], and they subsequently 
recalled more affective and characteristic reactions towards the product itself. Hence, 
what occurs between near and distant musing is much more than a mere shift in construal. 
In fact, a shift in construal may very well be the result, not of temporal frame, but of the 
unique human capacity to extract, recombine and reassemble elements in memory into 
imaginary events that have yet to occur (Schacter et al., 2007). 
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Chapter 7  
 
7 Contribution & General Discussion 
 
At the heart of this thesis is the idea that context influences category activation. 
Although this may seem rather obvious, it is rarely considered. The emerging interest in 
how category activation can bias consumer judgments when categorization is ambiguous 
(i.e., the single category belief problem) has yet to account for how context plays a role in 
category activation. The current thesis illustrates that novel hybrid devices encourage 
contextual rehearsal. That is, people try to make sense of an ambiguous product by 
exploring its immediate or broader context. This observation suggests that context 
predicts which category will come to mind. This is important because it would explain 
why certain categories tend to dominate consumer inferences for products with functions 
that span multiple categories.  
The aggregate value of the four propositions (P1 to P4) comes from their 
implications for management. Context is at least somewhat under the marketer’s control. 
Thus, marketers could use this information to strategically alter category activation. The 
applications are as vast as the implications. A marketer could use this information to 
better align with, alter, or exploit consumers’ functional expectations (study 1), attribute 
preference (study 2), perceptions of proto-typicality (study 3), and attitude stability (study 
4). Indeed, these four areas were not arbitrarily chosen. Each represents a domain that has 
struggled with contextual variability in one way or another. However, instead of trying to 
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circumvent the issue of contextual variability, this thesis embraced it as yet another tool 
in the marketer’s toolbox.  
 From a broad theoretical perspective, the inclusion of thematic processing offers a 
slant on category activation that does not require the assumption of perceptual 
similarity—a perspective that currently dominates in marketing (re: prototype and 
exemplar theory; Nosofsky, 1986; Smith & Medin, 1981). Likewise, the inclusion of 
schema congruity theory offers some insight into how certain activation strategies can be 
used to enhance product evaluations, particularly if they better fit the context. Although 
the substantive and theoretical merits of each study have been acknowledged in depth in 
each of the respective discussions, this thesis would not be complete without remarking 
on how the findings impact current practice and future research. Hence, I offer a short 
commentary on each study. 
To begin with, study 1 showed us that brands are inextricably linked not only to 
their category membership, but also to their normative context. For example, rarely do we 
stop and consider the adjustment required of consumers to accept the iPad was relatively 
small, considering Apple already occupied the space with their Macbook (the laptop 
category), and occupied the functional transition with their iPhone (touch screen). 
Contrast this with the leap required of consumers to accept Apple Television (what would 
have been called iTV, if not for the rights being held by a UK broadcast company). From 
a strategic standpoint, the iPad and iTV equally leverage Apple’s core competencies. 
Both are tech-based. Both run off similar software platforms. Indeed, our televisions may 
soon “have an app for that.” However, Apple does not currently occupy the television 
category or the broadcast space. Hence, the novelty of Apple television was compounded 
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by violating not only the product category, but also the normative context. This left Apple 
in a rather unfamiliar position—they failed. They have since relegated their ambitions for 
the iTV to a ‘hobby,’ a work in progress.4 The point is that Apple did not only fail the 
category, they failed the context. Effort to establish category membership is futile if you 
do not establish the contextual norm. In a sense, Apple may have missed a great 
opportunity to bring internet to television as opposed to television to internet.     
Unlike study 1, the contributions of study 2 were a bit more pragmatic. Study 2 
offered unique insight into how context influences choice. From a methodological 
perspective, prior work has focused predominantly on the choice composition as a means 
of eliciting context effects (Dhar, Nowlis, & Sherman, 2000). Researchers have yet to 
consider the external context, where choice is embedded. Study 2 extends this work by 
showing how the external environment can influence how consumers trade-off the 
strengths and weaknesses of different product attributes. Consider the implications. All 
current studies exploring attribute preference when categorization is ambiguous have 
done so in the absence of context. The results of study 2 illustrate the power of context in 
predicting category membership above and beyond even the product’s label (one of the 
strongest category cues). Hence, it would not be a stretch to question the reliability of 
past results.  
Beyond the obvious implications of going against the fundamental prediction of the 
single category belief problem, study 2 also offers the unique approach of embedding 
conjoint techniques, like DCE, within a broader experimental paradigm. This mixed-
                                                 
4
 http://www.macworld.com/article/164978/2012/01/apple_tv_hobby_nets_1_4m_quarterly_sales.html 
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method approach could be used in the future to generate important insight into 
moderators for alignable and nonalignable preference (see Markman & Lowenstein, 
2010). Furthermore, because conjoint techniques are just as prevalent in practice and they 
are in academia, observing that the external context can influence the technique is 
something that manufacturers should not ignore. It is in this respect that study 2 answered 
recent calls for greater realism and relevance (Reibstein, Day, & Wind, 2009), by testing 
emerging theory within a more realistic context, and by eliciting preference as opposed to 
relying on self-report inferences—answering a major criticism in the single category 
belief literature (Hayes & Newell, 2009). 
This brings us to study 3. Beyond the obvious implications that flow from the 
finding that thematically cued advertisements can alter the typicality of an ambiguous 
product, the finding that people can bind disparate products together under a normative 
context has considerable implications for researchers exploring the influence of the 
advertising context (i.e., the ad composition). To date, researchers exploring the effects of 
ad context have only documented relational elaboration within an advertising array of 
competing goods (within-category); when exploring disparate products (between-
category) researchers have only documented item-specific elaboration (Malaviya, 2007; 
Malaviya et al., 1996; Noseworthy et al., 2011). Study 3 extends this literature by 
demonstrating that a strong contextual cue can thematically unite disparate products 
through conventional association, and this not only encourages relational elaboration, but 
it enhances product evaluations (consistent with the fit conditions in studies 1 and 2), and 
most importantly, it tends to persist even when the contextual cue is no longer present.  
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Where study 3 makes a significant departure from the other studies, is in revealing 
a cost to the fit hypothesis. Recent evidence suggests that certain consumers—females in 
particular—who utilize the advertising context to make sense of an extremely 
incongruent product tend to show a reduction in ad claim recognition (i.e., they have a 
hard time recalling the actual claims that were made in the ad; Noseworthy et al., 2011). 
In a similar vein, study 3 confirmed that most consumers, regardless of gender, use the 
context to varying degrees to make sense of product ambiguity, and because of this, they 
tend to suffer a similar deficit in ad claim recognition. Hence, the results of study 3 afford 
a cautionary note for marketers who may want to employ the fit hypothesis. From an 
even more pragmatic perspective, it could be argued that researchers exploring ad 
recognition without accounting for context may be inflating their results. 
Finally, the results of study 4 represent some of the more fascinating effects 
observed in this thesis. We have all bought something only to later regret it. A recent 
study commissioned by Kodak in the UK revealed that British consumers will regret 
wasting more than £49,000 in their lifetime. The biggest contributors to post-purchase 
regret: clothing (32%), technology products (18%), and shoes (14%).5 It should be no 
surprise then that in an unrelated survey of 1,694 British consumers, who recently had 
purchased the iPhone, revealed that 22% (one in five) regretted their purchase.6 Of the 
reasons given, 43% said that they were jealous of rival cell phones. Indeed, this would 
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 http://newslite.tv/2010/12/09/brits-regret-49000-of-pointles.html 
6
 http://www.computerandvideogames.com/326765/22-of-iphone-buyers-regret-purchase-survey-says/ 
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bode well for iPhone’s number one rival, Android. Unfortunately, the return rate for most 
Android phones is purportedly as high as 40%.7  
So who’s holding all the chips? Who wins in this exchange? Study 4 suggests that 
we all lose—consumer and manufacturer alike. Consumers often purchase products in 
anticipation of what the usage experience will be. As a result, the product is consumed in 
prospect. The problem with this is that prospective judgments are biased by affect. So 
when we imagine interacting with the Blackberry Torch, for example, we do not imagine 
it being heavy or cumbersome. In the end, we are often left disappointed because the true 
usage experience seldom lives up to an idealized expectation. Unfortunately, this often 
cues us to reconsider the alternatives, and thus we do the entire dance again. Hence, it 
should not be surprising that near and distant preferences are inconsistent, rather it would 
be shocking if they were consistent.  
It is important to note that this work focused specifically on initial exposure (e.g., 
when someone first sees a new hybrid product in an advertisement or an in-store display). 
This work did not take into account the usage context (Ratneshwar & Shocker, 1991), 
which is no less important when discussing schematic structures and schematic 
inconsistency. Researchers have shown that usage substitutability can frame similarity 
judgments, whereas usage versatility can alter protoypicality estimates (Ratneshwar & 
Shocker, 1991). This is quite meaningful because it supports the general observation that 
many successful hybrid combinations succeed after being subtyped into their own 
category (i.e., tablets). Hence, one of the limitations of this work is that it defines context 
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 http://techcrunch.com/2011/07/26/androids-dirty-secret-shipping-numbers-are-strong-but-returns-are-30-
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at the categorical level, when we know that schematic structures extend well beyond 
competing prototypes to include the product’s usage occasion and valence. 
With that said, the point of this work was to capture the initial moment when 
consumers make sense of a new hybrid product using existing knowledge. Although 
researchers have shown that expert and novice consumers differ when using existing 
knowledge to estimate multi-functional preference (Moreau et al., 2001a), this work 
extends these findings by illustrating that context can in some cases serve the same 
function as expertise. For example, after observing that consumers who were low in 
camera knowledge yet high in computer knowledge were most likely to purchase a digital 
camera, whereas those high in camera knowledge and low in computer knowledge were 
least likely, Moreau, Lehmann and Markman (2001a, p. 27) concluded that “advertising 
the digital camera in PC Magazine would likely be more effective than advertising it in 
Popular Photography.” The results of this thesis support this finding but caution that the 
effect may have more to do with schematic activation than domain-specific knowledge. 
Indeed, when it comes to hybrid products, high expertise in one specific category may 
serve the same function as a contextual cue in that it sets the base referent. Hence, as 
observed in study 2, supplementary features would then contribute greater utility because 
they ultimately augment the base. Nevertheless, given the stimuli used in this thesis 
consolidated rather common and well-established categories, it would be interesting to 
see if the observed effects hold with a less familiar artifact combination.    
Implicit in this thesis is a fundamental question of relevancy (Reibstein et al., 
2009). Context is integral to consumption. How many times have you purchased a piece 
of furniture only to bring it home and question its appeal? We forget that the piece of 
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furniture was staged by a professional within a context that augments its qualities—be 
they colour, size, or texture. The context of your living room rarely is decorated with 
such purpose. For the most part, all products are staged, whether in print, on a shelf, or on 
television screen. Why then do we test product categorization, inferences, and evaluations 
in isolation from context? The answer is because context is messy. This is the paradigm 
problem that is plaguing marketing. If we adopt our principles from cognitive 
psychology, and forgo context in an effort to secure internal validity, we are relegated to 
findings that lend themselves to cognitive psychology, not to marketing. The strength of 
internal validity is not that it makes an observation true, but that it makes an explanation 
for the observation viable. Hence, we risk being left with incredible explanations for 
observation that no one can use. This thesis argues that context can be incorporated in 
most designs with little cost to internal validity. Indeed, cognitive psychology has 
championed and almost perfected the art of control and elegance in design by removing 
context. Marketers may be better served, however, from something a little less tidy.   
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 the brand fit the target product (PEN). 
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 Note.—Location photos were blurred, muted, and minimized under the guise that the target product was somewhere 
in the photo. Stimuli used in Noseworthy, Wang, and Islam (forthcoming).
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